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Last November, this country was saved from an impending
disaster, when the President signed the Bipartisan Budget Act of
2015 into law on November 2, 2015.1 Before that, it looked like the
Social Security Disability Trust Fund would default. Default could
have been disastrous, not only for beneficiaries, but for our entire
economy.
Although most Americans consider Social Security as a unitary
program, two separate trust funds are involved:
1.the Old-Age and Survivors’ Insurance (OASI) program and
2.the Social Security Disability (DI) program.2
Old-age benefits were enacted in 1935 and have been paid
monthly since 1940.3 Benefits for disabled workers were established
in 1956 and a separate trust fund has been maintained since then.4
This paper concentrates on the DI Fund.
The 2014 Trustees’ Annual Report projected that the DI Trust
Fund reserves would have been depleted in the fourth quarter of
2016, and the combined OASI and DI Trust Funds would have been
depleted in 2033.5
* Administrative law judge, United States Department of Labor; past Federal
Administrative Law Judges’ Conference (FALJC) president and FALJC liaison
member of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS); past chair,
National Conference of the Administrative Judiciary, Judicial Division, American
Bar Association (ABA); and former long-time member of the ABA House of
Delegates. Author, Breaking Up With Cuba: The Dissolution of Friendly Relations
between Washington and Havana, 1956-1961, 4 INT’L J. CUBAN STUD. 109 (2012).
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Labor or any other
organization.
 Congress Passes H.R. 1314, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, SOC. SEC.
LEGISLATIVE BULLETIN, 114-18 (November 3, 2015).
DI refers to Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) also known as Title II
benefits, named for the chapter title of the governing section of the Social Security
Act.
! Robert J. Myers, Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Provisions:
Summary of Legislation, 1935-58, 22 SOC. SEC. BULLETIN 15, (1959).
" Id. at 20.
# Informational Report: Disability Insurance Trust Fund, A-15-15-15024,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 3 (Dec. 1, 2014),
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Until that time, given Congressional inaction, it appeared that
default was inevitable.6

http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-15-15-15024.pdf [hereinafter
Informational Report]:
DI Trust Fund reserves expressed as a percent of annual cost (the
trust fund ratio) declined to 40 percent at the beginning of 2015,
and the Trustees project trust fund depletion late in 2016, the
same year projected in the last Trustees Report. DI costs have
exceeded non-interest income since 2005, and the trust fund
ratio has declined in every year since peaking in 2003. While
legislation is needed to address all of Social Security’s financial
imbalances, the need has become urgent with respect to the
program’s disability insurance component. Lawmakers need to
act soon to avoid automatic reductions in payments to DI
beneficiaries in late 2016.
Jacob J. Lew et al., A Summary of the 2015 Annual Reports, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.
(2015), http://www.ssa.gov/oact/trsum/. This had been known for many years. See,
Policy Options for the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, Publ’n No.
4207, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (2012), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112thcongress-2011-2012/reports/43421-DisabilityInsurance_print.pdf.
[hereinafter
Publ’n No. 4207] CBO projected that DI outlays would peak in 2016 and taper off
beginning in FY 2017. Id. at 1.
$ See Harold A. Pollack, Saving SSDI: As the disability-insurance program’s
trust fund runs out of cash, there are new signs of internal reform—but more
changes
are
needed.
THE
ATLANTIC
(August
31,
2015)
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/08/ssdi-social-security-disabilityinsurance/402475; Max Ehrenfreund, Social Security Disability Payments Will be
Cut by a Fifth if Congress Doesn’t Act, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (January 7,
2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/01/07/socialsecurity-disability-payments-would-be-cut-by-a-fifth-without-new-action/. For the
rationale in forcing DI Trust Fund default see Nicholas Ballasy, Greenspan: US
'Way Underestimating' the National Debt, PJ MEDIA (May 30, 2015),
http://pjmedia.com/blog/greenspan-u-s-way-underestimating-the-national-debt/
fund/2015/06/07/id/649228/. Al Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal
reserve stated:
The notion that we have a trust fund is nonsense – that trust fund
has no meaning whatsoever except for the fact as an all private
fund to benefit programs, if it runs out of money, you can only
pay out in cash flows that come in but the probability that will
happen is not particularly high.
Dartagnan, Diary Entry Republicans Move To Gut Social Security Benefits on
Their First Day in Power, THE DAILY KOS (Jan. 07, 2015),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/01/07/1356086/-Republicans-Move-To-GutSocial-Security-Benefits-on-Their-First-Day-in-Power#.
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The President requested Congress to reallocate the Social
Security payroll tax rate to avoid default in fiscal year (FY) 2016.
Trust funds had been transferred between the two funds eleven times,
most recently in 1994.7 In the proposed 2016 budget, President
Obama proposed increasing the portion of the payroll tax going to the
disability fund by 0.9 percentage point, redirecting $330 billion from
the retirement fund over five years.8
Employees and employers now each pay a 6.2% payroll tax that
funds both the disability insurance trust fund and the much larger
retirement-benefits fund, which is currently expected to be depleted
in 2034.9

% Kristina Peterson, Parties Clash Over Social Security Disability Trust Fund,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/parties-clash-over-socialsecurity-disability-trust-fund-1423696405.
& Id.
' Id. According to Ms. Peterson and the Wall Street Journal, the proposed
administration budget proposal reallocation “would mean that both the [OASI and
the DI] trust funds would be depleted in 2033, a year earlier than otherwise
projected for the retirement fund.” Id.; see also Informational Report, supra note
5, at 3. However, in response, House Republicans passed a rule prohibiting it
unless steps were also taken to shore up Social Security’s overall finances. See
Kathy Ruffing & Paul N. Van de Water, Congress Needs to Boost Disability
Insurance Share of Payroll Tax by 2016, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES
(July
31,
2014),
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-1614socsec.pdf; Kathy Ruffing & Paul N. Van de Water, Boosting Disability
Insurance Share of Social Security Payroll Tax Would Not Harm Retirees, CTR. ON
BUDGET
&
POLICY
PRIORITIES
(Dec.
2,
2014),
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/12-2-14ss.pdf.
William
R.
Morton, Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) Reform: An Overview of
Proposals to Reduce the Growth in SSDI Rolls, CONG. RESEARCH SERVS.,10
(2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43054.pdf, outlines an increase in the
number of insured workers due to population growth and a rise in the percentage of
the working-age population insured for disability resulted in an expansion in the
size of the insured-worker population as factors for insolvency. He documents that
“growth in the size of the female insured-worker population coincided with a rapid
rise in the incidence rate of women in the [DI] program.” Id. at 11. However, he
also notes “SSA’s Chief Actuary projects that both male and female age-adjusted
incidence rates should stabilize between five and six awards per 1,000 disabilityexposed workers in the future.” Id. He also documents that “[b]eginning in 1996,
working-age baby boomers increasingly entered their most disability prone years
(aged 50 to full retirement age [FRA]), thereby shifting the age distribution of the
insured-worker population from younger workers (aged 25 to 44) to older workers
(aged 45 to FRA).” Id. He also documents that a “decreased likelihood of dying in
a given year helped to increase the chance of an individual surviving to his or her
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This paper may provide some solutions to forego disaster.
There is often confusion about DI and Supplemental Security
Income (SSI). DI benefits are based on Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance and Disability Insurance (OASDI),10 Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (FICA), taxes collected from wage earners.11 At
present, the maximum amount of earnings subject to the Social
Security tax (the “taxable maximum”) is $118,500 for 2015.12
Employers and employees each contribute 6.2 % to the taxable
minimum to OASDI.13 Self-employed individuals pay the full 12.4%
personally.14 “Of an estimated 168 million workers who will pay
FICA taxes in 2015, about 10 million will pay higher taxes because
of an annual increase in the taxable maximum.”15 In essence, the DI
program is an “early retirement” policy for workers who meet the
terms of a policy of “social insurance.”16 In order to qualify, as a
predicate, workers must have paid enough OASDI taxes to be fully or
currently insured17 and meet “disability” requirements. The definition
of disability contains a duration test; if the impairment (1) is not
expected to result in death, and (2) has neither lasted twelve months
nor is expected to last for a continuous period of twelve months, the
claimant is “not disabled.”18 In 2014, Social Security paid 141
billion to almost 11 million disability beneficiaries and their family
most disability-prone years (aged 50 to FRA).” Id.at 12. He also notes that dips in
the economy, especially unemployment rates, is proportionate to increases in DI
applications and awards. Id. at 13-14; see also Publ’n No. 4207, supra note 5, at 4
(Congressional Budget Office “(CBO) in conjunction with the staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated the budgetary effects of a variety of
potential modifications to the DI program.”). This paper also addresses several
budgetary effects of DI program modifications.
 Lew, supra note 5.
 Imposed on both employees and employers to fund Social Security and
Medicare. Id.
 Id.
! Including Medicare, each contributes a total of 7.65% for a total of 15.3%.
Id. Also, as of January 2013, individuals with earned income of more than
$200,000 ($250,000 for married couples filing jointly) pay an additional 0.9
percent in Medicare taxes. Id.
" Id.
# Id.
$ Morton, supra note 9, at 2.
% 42 U.S.C. § 414(a)-(b) (2012).
& See 42 USC § 423(d)(1)(A) (2012).
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members.19 When recipients become eligible for DI, they also
become eligible for Medicare.20 Disabled workers are paid from the
DI fund at the same rate as retired workers until the full retirement
age is met, when they are converted to OASI beneficiaries.21 SSA
annually adjusts benefit levels to account for inflation through Costof-Living Adjustments (COLA), as measured by the Consumer Price
Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W).22 At
one time retirement age was 65; now it is 66 and will eventually
increase.23 More than 450,000 people between ages 65 and 66, who
under former law would have achieved full retirement, currently
receive DI benefits.24
“Eligibility for [DI does not take accumulated wealth or passive
income, such as the benefits paid by a long-term disability (LTD)

'

Peterson, supra note 7 (paraphrasing Acting Social Security Commissioner
Carolyn Colvin).
 Twenty-nine months from the date of onset. Morton, supra note 9, at 3.
Also eligible are disabled widow(er)s and disabled adult children (grown children
of a retired, disabled, or retired worker who suffered onset of a disabling
impairment before age 22), two smaller categories who also qualify under Title II
of the Social Security Act. See id. at 7.
 Kathy Ruffing, Social Security Disability Insurance is Vital to Workers with
Severe Impairments, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 3 (Aug. 9, 2012),
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/8-9-12ss.pdf.
20 C.F.R. § 404.272(a)(1).
! In a legislative fix in 1983, Congress incrementally increased the full
retirement age (FRA) from 65 to 67, thereby expanding the maximum penalty for
taking early retirement at age 62 from a 20% to a 30% reduction in cash benefits
(based on year of birth). Morton, supra note 9, at 21.
" Statistics should become available to show whether many recipients enrolled
in DI primarily because they did not have medical insurance prior to Obamacare
and needed Medicare. Nearly five percent of all DI beneficiaries are between the
age of sixty-five and sixty-six. Ruffing, supra note 21 at 3. After Congress
increased the age requirement for OASDI from sixty-five to sixty-six, “under the
rules in place a decade ago,” the six-five year olds “would have been receiving
retirement benefits instead.”
Id.
The author argues that although the
administration did not concentrate on resolving the impending default,
demographics explain most of the growth. Id. at 2 “Baby boomers into their highdisability years.” Id. She notes that more women are now qualified for disability
benefits, and that “this has been a large factor behind the increase in the number of
DI beneficiaries.” Id. at 3. It is also reasonable that poor labor market prospects
due to changes in the nature of work and the 2008 recession contributed. Id. at 4.
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insurance policy, into account when determining eligibility.”25 Some
private disability insurance policies require that the insured apply for
DI benefits and, if received, LTD benefits will be offset by the
amount of DI.26 Some LTD policies permit collection of benefits
after a recipient is qualified for DI, but many others do not.27 In many
cases, LTD policies cut the DI benefits once a recipient is approved.
LTD benefits are not governmental benefits subject to offset.28
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is a welfare type program, a
federal income supplement program funded by general tax revenues
not Social Security taxes.29 SSI is designed to help aged, blind, and
disabled people, who have little or no income; and provides cash to
meet basic needs for food, clothing, and shelter.30 The Social
Security Administration (SSA) considers an applicant’s income and
resources to establish eligibility for SSI.31 Payments to SSI recipients
do not affect the DI trust fund in any manner because they are funded
separately.32 When a recipient is eligible for SSI, they are also
usually automatically eligible for state Medicaid.33 However, SSA
offsets SSI benefits based on receipt of other public benefits,
including DI cash benefits.34
Some recipients are entitled to both DI and SSI. This is because
although the recipient is currently and fully insured, the OASDI
# Dell Markey, Can You Combine Social Security Benefits and Long-Term
Disability Policy?, ZACKS, http://finance.zacks.com/can-combine-social-securitybenefits-longterm-disability-policy-7804.html.
$ See also Disability Insurance, CANCER LEGAL RESEARCH CENTER (2008),
https://disabilityrightslegalcenter.org/sites/disabilityrightslegalcenter.org/files/about
/documents/DisabilityInsuranceNational.pdf.
% See also Markey, supra note 25.
& DI 52125.005 Benefits Not Considered a Public Disability Benefit (PDB),
SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (May 28, 2009), http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0452125005.
' William R. Morton, Primer on Disability Benefits: Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), CONG. RESEARCH
SERVS. (Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32279.pdf.
! Id. at 5.
! Id. at 6-7.
! Id.
!! Understanding Supplemental Security Income SSI And Other Government
Programs, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (2015), https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-other-ussi.htm.
!" Rene Parent, Profile of Social Security Disabled Workers and Dependents
Who Have a Connection to Workers' Compensation or Public Disability Benefits,
Research and Statistics Note No. 2012-03, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Sept. 2012),
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/rsnotes/rsn2012-03.html.
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contribution did not generate a significant DI benefit because the
amount of DI benefits depends on the amount of contribution.35
On the other hand, benefits paid to disabled workers and their
families may be reduced for receipt of certain public disability
benefits such as Workers' Compensation.36 Benefits to family
members may be limited by a family maximum benefit.37
If the DI Trust Fund defaults, current and prospective recipients
would receive only about 80% of their current income.38 The DI
Trust Fund was a year away from default in . . . 1994, when
Congress reallocated the Social Security 12.4% payroll tax rate,
providing a little more for DI, but no change in the total tax rate.39
The 1995 Trustees Report projected that DI Trust Fund reserves
would remain adequate until 2016.40 The number of DI recipients
tripled since 1980, and doubled since 1995.41
The Disability Insurance Trust Fund finished the first quarter of
2015 with $54.3 billion in U.S. government bonds. This was down
$5.9 billion from the end of 2014.42 The Disability Insurance Trust
Fund had lost $6.4 billion in the first quarter of 2014.43
Internal SSA documents disclosed:
[a]bsent another act of Congress, the Social Security Act does not
permit further inter-Fund borrowing. The Social Security Act also
specifies that benefit payments shall be made only from the Trust

!#

Id. at 3.
Id. at 6-7.
!% 20 C.F.R. § 404.403
!& Informational Report, supra note 5 at 7. The author is skeptical of the
Inspector General’s assessment that the quick fix would be used.
!' Ruffing & Van de Water, supra note 9, at 1-2. Trust funds have been
transferred between the two funds eleven times, most recently in 1994. Id. at 2.
" The Financing Challenges Facing the Social Security Disability Insurance
Program Before the Ways and Means Subcomm. on Soc. Sec., 113 Cong. 1 (2013)
(statement by Stephen C. Goss, Chief Actuary, Soc. Sec. Admin.),
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/oact/testimony/HouseWM_20130314.pdf.
" Ruffing, supra note 21 at 2 (figure 1 illustrates this).
"
Trust Fund Data First Calendar Quarter of 2015, SOC. SEC. ONLINE.,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/cgi-bin/ops_series.cgi (follow “Single time period”
hyperlink; then search year field for “2015” and select calendar quarter 1)
[hereinafter Trust Fund Data].
"! Charles T. Hall, Updated Disability Insurance Trust Numbers, SOC. SEC.
NEWS (Apr. 28, 2015), http://socsecnews.blogspot.com/2015/04/updated-disabilityinsurance-trust-fund.html.
!$
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Funds (that is, accumulated Trust Fund assets and current tax
income). Consequently, if the Social Security Trust Funds become
depleted—that is, if current tax income and accumulated assets are
not sufficient to pay the benefits to which people are entitled—
current law would effectively prohibit full Social Security benefits
from being paid on time. The Agency would then have to decide
whether to pay disabled beneficiaries 81 percent of their scheduled
benefits on time, delay benefit payments until enough funds are
available, or determine another alternative.44
In 2001, President G.W. Bush appointed a Commission on Social
Security to focus on Social Security privatization.45 In 2005, at the
start of his second term, President Bush formally proposed Social
Security privatization as a cure for expected shortfalls.46 Michael J.
Astrue was confirmed by the Senate as Commissioner on February 2,
2007. 47 Andrew G. Biggs, former assistant director of the CATO
Project on Social Security Privatization and who had written
favorably about privatization of the DI program, was appointed
Principal Deputy Commissioner to Mr. Astrue in 2007.48
During this time, and most especially after 2008, more attention
was paid to backlogs in the disability system than in impending
default of the DI trust fund.49 Actually, DI trust funds were in
""

Informational Report, supra note 5 at 7.
2001 President’s Reform Commission, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., (2001),
https://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/pcsss/pcsss.html.
"$ State of the Union, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (2005), http://georgewbushhitehouse.archives.gov/stateoftheunion/2005/.
"% Mr. Astrue previously served SSA as Counselor to the Commissioner,
served in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services as General Counsel
and as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Legislation, was former Associate
Counsel to the President of the United States at the White House in the Reagan and
George H. W. Bush administrations. In the private sector, He practiced law and
was as a senior executive at several biotechnology companies and also had been a
member of ACUS. Michael J. Astrue, Social Security, SOC. SEC. ONLINE PRESS
OFFICE. https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/factsheets/astrue.htm (last visited Apr. 7,
2016).
"& In 2005, Mr. Biggs was Associate Director of the National Economic
Council; he worked on Social Security “reform” for the White House and, in 2001,
had been on the staff of the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security,
a euphemism for privatization. Andrew G. Biggs, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE (2016), https://www.aei.org/scholar/andrew-g-biggs/.
"' Improving Social Security Disability Insurance Claim Processing in Ohio
Before S. Homeland Sec. & Gov. Affairs Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov. Mgmt.,
"#The
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surplus until the economic downturn in 2008.50 In the preceding
fourteen years the system was entirely self- supporting.51 When the
program runs a surplus, excess funding is available that year.52 The
excess funds are diverted to the trust funds, in the form of treasury
bonds.53
Federal law requires that all excess funds be invested in interestbearing securities backed by the full faith and credit of the United
States. The Department of the Treasury currently invests all program
revenues in special non-marketable securities of the U.S.
Government which earn a market rate of interest. The balances in the
trust funds, which represent the accumulated value, including
interest, of all prior program annual surpluses and deficits, provide
automatic authority to pay benefits.54
The trust funds do not represent a legal obligation to individual
program recipients, and Congress could cut or raise taxes on such
benefits if it chooses.55
Trust funds are considered "intragovernmental" debt, a component of the "public" or "national" debt.56
the Fed. Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement
of
Michael
J.
Astrue,
Comm’r
of
Soc.
Sec.),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg63865/pdf/CHRG111shrg63865.pdf. See also Hearings Backlog Reduction Update, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN. (2009), www.socialsecurity.gov/appeals/congressional-booklets.html
# Table 1.
# See Trust Fund Data, supra note 42.
#
Social
Security
Trust
Fund,
WIKIPEDIA
(2016),
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Security_Trust_Fund.
#! See Lew, supra note 5.
#" Id.
##
Social
Security
Trust
Fund,
WORLDLIBRARY.ORG,
http://www.worldlibrary.org/Article.aspx?Title=Social_Security_Trust_Fund (last
visited Apr. 7, 2016).
#$ See David Pattison, Social Security Trust Fund Cash Flows and Reserves,
75 SOC. SEC. BULLETIN 1, 1 (2015).
The Social Security trust funds date back to the “Old-Age
Reserve Account,” established under the 1935 Social Security
Act. The act authorized Congress to appropriate funds to the
reserve account and separately established a new payroll tax
sufficient to provide those funds. However, because a recent
Supreme Court decision (unrelated to Social Security) had raised
questions about the constitutionality of appropriating the tax
revenues directly to the reserve account, the act did not explicitly
earmark those revenues to the account. Nevertheless, it was
understood that Congress would simply appropriate the tax
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In 2010, President Obama empaneled a Commission to study
Social Security, but it did not make specific recommendations to
reform the DI or SSI programs.57 However:
The Commission recommends a comprehensive redesign of the
DI program to modernize both the program objectives and the
eligibility criteria to better provide adequate and appropriate support
to the disabled community without putting in place barriers to work
and full community participation.58
“The Moment of Truth: Report of the National Commission on
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform,” December, 2010.59
In 2011 and 2012, as part of an economic stimulus package, the
federal government temporarily reduced employees' share of payroll
taxes from 6.2% to 4.2% of compensation.60 A resulting shortfall was
appropriated from the general Government funds. This increased
public debt, but did not advance the year of depletion of the Trust
Fund.61

revenues for that purpose even without a statutory requirement to
do so. By the time the act was first amended in 1939, the
constitutional questions had been resolved, and the 1939
amendments provided for automatic appropriation of the payroll
taxes to the reserve account. Under both the 1935 act and the
1939 amendments, the accumulated reserves were invested in
interest-bearing Treasury securities, with the interest accruing to
the reserves.
Id.
#%

Obama Fiscal Social Security Proposals, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/ObamaFiscal/SocialSecurityProposals.pdf (last
visited Apr. 7, 2016).
#& Id.
#' The Co-Chairmen were former Clinton Administration Chief of Staff
Erskine Bowles and former Republican Senator Alan Simpson. Many, if not most
of the members disagreed with major aspects of the report, and although they
issued separate statements, none specifically addressed the DI program. See
generally
Member
Statements,
FISCAL
COMM’N
(2010),
http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/Me
mberStatements.pdf.
$ Microhistory of Employee Benefits and Compensation, AON (Jul. 2013),
http://www.aon.com/attachments/human-capital-consulting/LR-F-July13_Microhistory_of_Employee_Benefits_and_Compensation.pdf.
$ See Social Security Trust Fund supra note 55 (citing Tax Relief,
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, sec.
601(e), (Jan. 5, 2010). See also A Summary of the 2014 Annual Reports, SOC. SEC.
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An increase in claims had long been predicted, but SSA failed to
plan ahead and if anything was guilty in mismanagement of the entire
disability trust fund.62 Even after the initiation of the Obama
administration’s Presidential Commission, SSA’s pending hearing
backlog grew from about 694,000 cases at the end of June 2010 to
approximately 955,000 at the end of June 2014.63 Average processing
MEDICARE
BDS
OF
TRS,(2014),
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/TRSUM/tr14summary.pdf..
$ Most of the increase comes from the aging of the “baby boomer,” postWorld War II, generation. CBO, Policy Options 2012. Also approximately 37% of
those eligible retire at age 62. See Rodney Brooks, What age is the best age to start
drawing Social Security benefits. The truth is, it depends. WASH. POST (Jun. 28,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/what-age-is-best-to-startdrawing-social-security-benefits-truth-is-it-depends/2015/06/25/42d2aca2-192311e5-93b7-5eddc056ad8a_story.html?tid=hpModule_79c38dfc-8691-11e2-9d71f0feafdd1394. A high percentage of that number immediately applies for DI. See
Appendix 1. 18 % take benefits at full retirement age (66 for most baby boomers),
and only 3 % at age 70. Brooks, supra note 62.
$! In his Congressional testimony in 2013, Mr. Goss related that the number of
disabled worker beneficiaries increased from 2.86 million in 1980 to 8.20 million
in 2010, an increase of 187 percent (while the number of workers rose by just 39
percent). Several main “drivers” have caused this disproportionate increase in the
number of beneficiaries:
•The first driver is the 41-percent increase in the total
population at ages 20 through 64 between 1980 and 2010, which
roughly matches the increase in workers.
•The second driver is the changing age distribution described
above, which resulted in a 38-percent increase in “prevalence” of
disability. (The gross disability prevalence rate grew 38 percent
more than the age-sex-adjusted prevalence rate between 1980 and
2010.)
•The third driver is the percent of the population at ages 20
through 64 that is disability insured. Since 1970, the disability
insured population grew substantially as increasing numbers of
women worked consistently and stayed insured. Between 1980
and 2010, the percent of the “disability-age” population that was
insured rose from about 50 to 68 percent for women, but declined
from about 77 to 74 percent for men. Overall, there was a net 8percent increase in the number of disabled worker beneficiaries.
This increase is relatively small because the proportion of the
population that is undocumented (and far less likely to become
disability insured) rose substantially between 1980 and 2010.
Soc. Sec. Admin. before the H Comm. on Ways and Means, Subcomm. on Soc.
Sec. (2013) (statement of Stephen C. Goss, Chief Actuary, Soc. Sec. Admin.).
https://www.ssa.gov/legislation/testimony_031413a.html.
AND
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time on hearings also increased from 415 days in June 2010 to 437
days in June 2014.64 SSA managers are accused of awarding benefits
to reduce case backlogs.65 The pressure to reduce backlogs may have
had a direct effect on outcomes.66 However, Mr. Astrue, the former
Commissioner, and Carolyn W. Colvin, the current Commissioner,
have each testified that 99% of Social Security disability payments
are accurate.67
The Social Security Act defines disability as the inability to
perform “substantial gainful activity” (SGA) due to a medically
determinable impairment that has lasted or is expected to last at least
one year or to result in death.68 SGA refers to the performance of
significant physical or mental activities in work for pay or profit or in
work of a type generally performed for pay or profit.69 SGA is a test
for determining both initial and continuing eligibility for Social
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI).70 In initial claims situations, if
a claimant’s work is at SGA, then the claimant generally does not
meet the definition of disability and does not receive benefits.71

$" Improve the Responsiveness and Oversight of the Hearings Process, SOC.
SEC. ADMIN., http://oig.ssa.gov/audits-and-investigations/top-ssa-managementissues/social-security-disability-hearings-backlog.
$# Clearing the Disability Backlog: SSA’s Administrative Law Judge and
Hearing Office Performance, SOC. SEC, ADMIN.,(Sept. 16, 2008),
http://oig.ssa.gov/newsroom/congressional-testimony/clearing-disability-backogssas-administrative-law-judge-and.
$$ See Morton, supra note 9 especially, A Lack of Consistency in the Initial
Determination Process, at 17-18.
$% Soc. Sec. Testimony before the S. Homeland Sec. and Gov. Affairs Comm.
(2010) (statement of Michael J. Astrue, Comm’r Soc. Sec.) SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.socialsecurity.gov/legislation/testimony_080410.html.
$& Sections 223(d) and 1614(a) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§423(d)(1)(A) and 42 U.S.C. §1623(d)(1)(A). See also 20 CFR Regulations No. 4,
part P, §§ 404.1513, 404.1520, 404.1520a, 404.1545, 404.1546, 404.1560,
404.1561, 404.1569a, and appendix 2; 20 C.F.R. No. 16, part I, §§ 416.913,
416.920, 416.920a, 416.945, 416.946, 416.960, 416.961, and 416.969a.
$'
See Substantially Gainful Activity, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN.,
https://www.socialsecurity.gov/oact/cola/sga.html (last accessed Apr. 7, 2016).
% Soc. Sec. Testimony before the Office of Research Demonstration, and
Employment Support, (2015) (statement of the Hon. David Weave Assoc.
Comm’r),
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.
https://www.ssa.gov/legislation/testimony_061615.html. [hereinafter Statement of
Hon. David Weave].
% Id.
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Countable earnings averaging over $1,090 a month (in 2015)
demonstrate the ability to perform SGA in most cases.72 For
claimants who are blind, countable earnings averaging over $1,820 a
month (in 2015) usually demonstrate SGA for SSDI.73
SSA uses a process called the sequential evaluation that will be
discussed below. If a claimant is engaged at SGA, then the claim is
denied.74 The claims are initially evaluated by the district office (DO)
in conjunction with state agencies, known as Disability
Determination Services or “DDS.”75 Claims of claimants in SGA
should not be forwarded for further review, per step 1 of the
sequential evaluation.76
Based on a longitudinal tracking of 2.6 million disability claims
filed in calendar year 2008, approximately 76% of all allowances
occurred at the initial or reconsideration levels.77 SSA authorizes
each DDS to purchase medical examinations, X-rays, and laboratory
tests on a consultative basis to supplement evidence obtained from
the claimants’ physicians or other treating sources when medical and
nonmedical evidence is insufficient to make a disability
determination.78 SSA reimburses the DDS for 100% of allowable
expenditures up to its approved funding authorization for costs.79
DDS withdraws federal funds through the Department of the
Treasury’s Automated Standard Application for Payments system to
pay for program expenditures.80
Statistics show that the initial DI allowance rate is very high for
younger individuals, ranging from 60% to 70% at ages 18 – 23.81 As
stated earlier, more than 450,000 people between ages 65 and 66,
%

Id.
Id.
%" Id.
%# Id.
%$ See Statement of Hon. David Weave, supra note 70.
%%
See Carolyn W. Colvin, Statement for the Record ,H. COMM. ON
OVERSIGHT AND GOV. REFORM (Jun. 11, 2014), http://oversight.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/Colvin-Statement-SSA-Disability-Appeals.pdf
%& Audit Report: Administrative Costs Claimed by the
Tennessee Disability Determination, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC.
ADMIN.
(2013),
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-04-1211298.pdf.
%' Id.
& Id.
& Meseguer, infra note 102.
%!

156

$!# #""#"#!#% & $"

,-'*

who under former law would have achieved full retirement, currently
receive DI benefits.82 The increase in retirement age has probably
been a significant factor in the increase in DI claims.
A RAND study estimated that up to 60% of applicants “could
have received a different initial determination from at least one other
examiner in the DDS office.”83 Although the appeals process
mitigated some of this variation, the study concluded that up to 23%
of claimants could have ultimately received a different outcome had
another examiner in the DDS office performed the determination.84
The RAND Corporation study found that of the denied claimants
who contested their initial determination, 75% had their denial
overturned eventually on appeal.85 Although DDS examiners base
&

Statistics should become available to show whether many recipients enrolled
in DI primarily because they did not have medical insurance prior to Obamacare
and needed Medicare. Ms. Ruffing points out that nearly five percent of all DI
beneficiaries – are in DI status. After Congress increased the age requirement for
OASDI from 65 to 66, under the rules in place a decade ago, the 65 year olds
would have been receiving retirement benefits instead. Ruffing, Social Security
Disability Insurance Is Vital to Workers With Severe Impairments, supra note 21.
She argues that although the administration did not concentrate on resolving the
impending default, demographics explain most of the growth. Baby boomers have
aged into their high-disability years. She notes that more women are now qualified
for disability benefits, and that this has been a large factor behind the increase in
the number of DI beneficiaries. Id. It is also reasonable that poor labor market
prospects due to changes in the nature of work and the 2008 recession contributed.
&! U.S. Congress, House Ways and Means, Social Security, Third in a Hearing
Series on Securing the Future of the
Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 112th Cong., 2nd sess. 112SS14, (Mar. 20, 2012), (testimony of Nicole Maestas) p. 3,
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/nicolemaestas_ss_3_20_12s.pdf. See
also Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J. Mullen, & Alexander Strand, Does Disability
Insurance Receipt Discourage Work?
Using Examiner Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of SSDI Receipt,
Working Paper WR853.3,
RAND
CORP.,
11
(2012),
http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR853-3.html [hereinafter Maestas et
al.].
&" Note that although the RAND study found that 23% of applicants could
have received a different outcome, there is no guarantee that the applicants would
have received a different decision had their cases been assigned to a different DDS
examiner.
&# Maestas et al., supra note 83, at. 22. They also found that the employment of
marginal program entrants would have been on average twenty-eight percentage
points higher two years after the initial determination had they not received SSDI.
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their initial determinations on uniform guidelines established by
SSA, regional differences in demographic, health, and employment
characteristics may produce variation in initial allowance rates
between DDS offices.86 The RAND study found variation in
determination outcomes across examiners within the same DDS
office.87
None of these studies established the effect of representation in
the eventual outcome of a case. The percentage of DI and SSI
claimants represented by attorneys at hearings has doubled since
1977, while the use of non-attorney representatives has stayed in the
10-20 percent range, although it has seen a steady increase since
2007.88 The figures for attorney and non-attorney representatives are
This figure drops to 16 percentage points four years after the initial determination.
However, these estimations reflect economic and labor market conditions between
2005 and 2006, and therefore may relate to the December 2007 to June 2009
recession. Id.
&$ SSA has identified several variables that affect differences geographically.
For example, the age of the population; it is logical to expect higher allowance
rates with an older population. “The only variable used in the analysis that could be
considered partially internal to the program is the percentage of applications based
on physical (as opposed to mental) impairments. It is internal in the sense that it
refers to a characteristic of the claimant rather than of the population. Although this
variable is largely independent of the claims process, an element of subjective
judgment exists in the classifying of disability cases. The analysis nevertheless uses
this variable because there is no corresponding characteristic that can be measured
in the state population.” Alexander Strand, Social Security Disability Programs:
Assessing the Variation in Allowance Rates, ORES Working Paper no. 98, SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.,
(Aug.
2002),
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/workingpapers/wp98.html. See also Norma B. Coe
et al., What Explains Variation in SSDI Application Rates?, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT
RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLL., WP#2011-23, http://crr.bc.edu/workingpapers/whatexplains- state-variation-in-ssdi-application-rates/. Historically, the
lowest participation in SSDI has been in Utah. The states with the highest
percentage of applications per population are West Virginia, Mississippi and
Arkansas. Five states enacted employer temporary disability insurance (TDI)
mandates prior to the first year of data included in this analysis: California (1946),
Hawaii (1969), New Jersey (1948), New York (1949), and Rhode Island (1942).
According to Coe, et al, holding all else constant, the five states that mandate
employer TDI should have lower SSDI application rates. Id.
&% Maestas et al., supra note 83, at 23.
&& Aspects of Disability
Decision Making: Data and Materials, SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., (Feb. 2012),
http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/1-11-CV-00224.pdf. [hereinafter Aspects
of Disability Decision Making].
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not additive since some claimants may have both.89 At the hearing
level and in the court appeals, effective representation may actually
be the most important outcome variable.90
Another outcome variable is state policy. There is wide variation
in SSD entry across states, with some states having entry percentages
twice as high as others.91 At present claimants who file in some states

&' Filing for Social Security Disability Benefits: What Impact Does
Professional
Representation Have on the Process at the Initial Level, SOC. SEC. ADVISORY
BD., 60 (2012), http://www.ssab.gov/
Reports/Third-Party-2012-Full.pdf.
'
By the time a case gets to hearing, a good lawyer can create an
overwhelming record. Even in an imperfect record, after the fact, good claimant
lawyers may be able to overcome any agency decision in the current posture. Under
the law, even if claims are appealed and lost at every level, including the United
States Supreme Court, the decision may very well be reopened through
modification. As people get older, it is expected that the human body will
deteriorate. 20 C.F.R. § 404.988 provides that a claim may be opened within a year
of filing the initial claim for any reason, or within 4 years for good cause. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.989. Good cause for reopening:
(a) We will find that there is good cause to reopen a determination or
decision if (1) New and material evidence is furnished;
New evidence very well may be supportive narrative reports or statements
from physicians whose opinions were discounted in the case decision.
' David Stapleton & Frank Martin, Vocational Rehabilitation on the Road to
Social Security Disability: Longitudinal Statistics from Matched Administrative
Data, WP 2012-269, UNIV. OF MICHIGAN RETIREMENT RESEARCH CTR. (2012),
http://www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/publications/papers/pdf/wp269.pdf. For an earlier
study see Alexander Strand, Social Security Disability Programs: Assessing the
Variation in Allowance Rates ORES Working Paper No. 98, SSA DIV. OF POLICY
EVALUATION, OFFICE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION, AND STATISTICS, OFFICE. OF
POLICY, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.(Aug. 2002). The major findings include the following:
•In 1997–1999, states with the highest and lowest allowance rates for
DI, SSI, and concurrent applications differed by about thirty percentage
points.
•States that have the highest and lowest allowance rates for DI or SSI
tend to retain that status over time, although some changes in ranking do
occur.
•States with high filing rates tend to have low allowance rates, and
vice versa.
•Adjusting for economic, demographic, and health factors cuts the
variation in allowance rates among states in half.
•The variation in the prevalence of disability beneficiaries in the
population has only a minimal ability to explain allowance rates.
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have a 70% chance of receiving an award, considering all levels,
initial, recon, ALJ, USDC and US Cir.92 In other states, claimants
have a 70% chance of losing at all levels.93
For example, in 2010 the percentage of cases decided favorably
for DI-only applicants ranged from a high of 59% in New Jersey to a
low of 34% in Tennessee.94 For SSI-only disability claims in 2010,
allowance rates ranged from 56% in Alaska to 24% in Mississippi.95
For concurrent DI-SSI claims, allowance rates ranged from 40% in
New Hampshire to 16% in West Virginia.96 The variation in
allowance rates may reflect different characteristics of claimants or in
the nature of industry in a particular area (e.g. mining,
manufacturing, farming, etc.)97 SSA should investigate the allegation
that many states merely pass on determinations in many claims that
should be awarded below.
The Social Security Advisory Board (SSAB or Board) has been
tracking the variation in allowance rates by state and adjudicative
stage, and suggested changes.98 As stated earlier, claimants who file
in some states have a 70% chance of receiving an award, considering
all levels, initial, recon, ALJ, USDC and US Cir.99 In other states,

•The allowance rates in most states are relatively close to the rates
predicted by demographic and socioeconomic factors.
•States that deviate from their predicted rates tend not to do so
consistently.
Id.. [Note that I have asked many times for updated information, without
success.]
' Id.
'! Many courts reject the entire process. See Freismuth v. Astrue, 920 F. Supp.
2d 943 (E.D. Wis. 2013) judicial rejection for the process may be the
administrative law equivalent to jury nullification.
'" Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance
Program,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.
(2010),
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/2010/di_asr10.pdf [hereinafter
Annual Statistical Report on SSDI].
'# Id.
'$ Id.
'% See Aspects of Disability Decision Making, supra note 88, at 43-44. See also
Stapleton & Martin, supra note 91.
'& See Outcome Variation in the Social Security Disability Insurance Program:
The Role of Primary Diagnoses, SOC. SEC. BULLETIN, VOL. 73, NO. 2 (2013),
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v73n2/v73n2p39.html
'' See Annual Statistical Report on SSDI, supra note 94.
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claimants have a 70% chance of losing at all levels.100 There is no
way to justify the statistics.101
The Board advocates strengthening the federal or state
arrangement to decrease the large disparities that exist between
different states regarding staff salaries, educational requirements,
training, and attrition rates. The Board also recommends reforming
the hearing process by establishing uniform procedures for claimant
representatives; having the government represented at the hearing
level or above; and closing the record after the decision, so that cases
do not change substantially at each level of appeal.102
Mr. Morton, for the Congressional Research Service, and Ms.
Ruffing, formerly of the Congressional Budget Office, have provided
the most thorough research on potential outcomes for the DI program
to date.103 Most of the growth in the program over the past twenty
years has stemmed from increases in disabled worker beneficiaries,
from around 2.9 million to almost 8.6 million—an increase of
196.6%.104 Conversely, the number of spouses of disabled workers
on DI decreased 64.5% during this period (from almost 461,900 to
more than 164,000).105 The number of children of disabled workers
receiving benefits expanded rather modestly compared with disabled
workers, increasing 35.7% (from nearly 1.4 million in 1980 to
roughly 1.9 million in 2011).106 There is no doubt that there are more
DI applicants and recipients.107 However, a close reading of DI Trust
Fund sources shows that any increases were predictable and, if


Id.
See Freismuth v. Astrue, 920 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D. Wis. 2013).
 Javier Meseguer, Outcome Variation in the Social Security Disability
Insurance Program: The Role of Primary Diagnoses, SOC. SEC. BULLETIN, VOL.
73, NO. 2 (2013), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v73n2/v73n2p39.html.
According to the literature, state allowance rates depend on the economic,
demographic, and health characteristics of the applicants, which vary among the
states. For instance, states with older populations are anticipated to have higher
disability allowance rates on average. Older applicants are more likely to qualify
because of the higher prevalence of age-related disabilities and the fact that they
face less stringent program standards than do younger individuals. From my
experience, some states simply do not want to develop the record.
! See Morton, supra note 9.
" Id.
# Id.
$ Id. at 8.
% See Morton, supra note 9.
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anything, SSA policy in the period from 2002 to 2013 accelerated the
problem.
The following are suggestions to help resolve the impending
default:
I. RECOMMENDATION ONE: SSA AS A CHARITY.
This proposal does not require any legislation or rulemaking.
Although the trust funds provide retirement income, they also support
needed resources to widows, orphans and the disabled among us.108
Donations to the trust funds are tax deductible.
Donations have been possible since a legislative fix in 1972.109
The managing trustee of the OASI and DI funds may accept money
gifts or bequests for deposit. Section 170(c)(l) of the Internal
Revenue Code lists the U.S. government among the educational or
charitable organizations to which donations are acceptable to receive
a tax deduction.110 Gifts must be unconditional, except that the donor
may designate the DI Trust Fund. If the donor does not designate the
DI Fund, SSA will credit it to the OASDI Trust Fund.
Donations may not make the fund solvent, but they can slow
down the rate of decline. SSA should include donation information in
their literature.111 The costs that would be involved to fully
implement this proposal should be negligible.
II.RECOMMENDATION TWO: INCREASE THE NUMBER OF CONTINUING
DISABILITY REVIEWS (CDRS) PERFORMED BY SSA.
Had Congress appropriated sufficient DI CDR funds and had
SSA properly administered them since 2004, there would, in essence,
have been no threatening DI Trust Fund default. Every Congress has
discussed the issue of funding CDRs since 1994, when the DI fund
was restored to solvency, but little has been done. Congress has been
&See Donations to the Social Security Trust Funds, SOC. SEC.ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/agency/donations.html#a0=2 (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
' Before 1972, bequests naming Social Security or a trust fund as a
beneficiary could not be accepted, which caused problems in administration of
some estates.
 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2015).
 See Daniel F. Solomon, Social Security: Maybe Charity Should Begin at
Home? 22 VOICE OF EXPERIENCE no. 4, 6-7 (2008). The paper was written for
lawyers, especially those who are involved with wills and trusts.
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“penny wise and pound-foolish.” Expansion of CDRs can remedy the
situation.
By the end of FY 2013, SSA had a CDR backlog of 1.3 million
claims.112 Apparently, the backlog has continued at the same pace
heading into FY 2016. DI recipients are to be re-evaluated every
three to seven years to determine whether their medical condition has
improved enough that they should no longer receive benefits.113 SSA
estimates that for every $1 spent on medical CDRs, the yield is about
$9 in savings to SSA programs as well as Medicare and Medicaid
over 10 years.114 In FY 2013, 428,658 medical CDRs were
completed; more than 115,000 of these, or about 27%, resulted in an
initial cessation of benefits.115
If the 27% denial rate holds, the existing CDR law and
regulations should be, standing alone, ultimately be sufficient to
bring the DI Trust Fund into solvency.116 However, Congress has

 Examining the Ways the Soc. Sec. Admin. Can Improve the Disability
Review Process Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov. Reform, H. Subcomm.
on Energy Policy, Health Care and Entitlements (April 9, 2014) (statement of
Inspector
Gen.
Patrick
P.
O'Carroll,
Jr.,
Soc.
Sec.
Admin.)
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/testimony/O'Carroll%209%20Apr%202014%2
0Written%20Statement%20Final.pdf [hereinafter Statement of Inspector Gen.
O’Carroll Jr.]. Projected savings reflect the present value of future benefits for
OASDI, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Medicare, and Medicaid as of
September 30, 2010. Projected savings do not take into account the lifetime
benefits of terminated beneficiaries processed outside SSA’s central release system.
The $9.3 to $1.0 savings-to-cost ratio is calculated by dividing OC Act’s projected
future savings of more than $3.5 billion by the $381 million spent on periodic
CDRs in FY2010. However, see the discussion infra, suggesting that the MIRS
medical improvement requirement be scrapped. Letter from Michael Astrue,
Comm’r Soc. Sec., to Hon. Joseph R. Biden Jr., President of the S. (May 1, 2012),
http://ssa.gov/legislation/FY%202010%20CDR%20Report.pdf. See also Annual
Report of Continuing Disability Reviews, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (2012),
http://ssa.gov/legislation/FY%202010%20CDR%20Report.pdf.
[hereinafter
Annual Report of Continuing Disability Reviews].
!
Reviewing
Your
Disability,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.
(2015),
https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10068.pdf.
" Id. In 2012, the estimate was about $10 for each $1. 24 Annual Report of
Continuing Disability Reviews, supra note 112.
# Id.
$ The Future Financial Status of the Social Security Program, SOC.
SEC.BULLETIN,
VOL.
70,
N O.
3
(2010),
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v70n3/v70n3p111.html.
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underfunded CDRs, especially since 2004, and should appropriate
enough funding to maximize savings.
In Budget Justifications to Congress, SSA asserts that it:
•Completed 429,000 full medical CDRs in 2013;117 and
•Completed over three million overpayment actions118 and
•Planned for 888,000 full medical CDRs in 2015.119
•Planned to increase to 908,000 in FY 2016.120
However, under the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA), which
was to provide SSA’s integrity funding through FY2021, funding is
limited.121 The base SSA program integrity funding ($273 million)
and the SSA cap adjustment ($1,166 million) were proposed to be

% Carolyn Colvin, Justification of Estimates for Appropriations Committees
Fiscal Year 2015: Fulfilling Our Commitments to the American People, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN. (2014), http://www.ssa.gov/budget/FY15Files/2015FCJ.pdf.
& Id.
' Id.
  Carolyn Colvin, FY 2016 Budget Overview, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/budget/FY16Files/2016BO.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
  Please see research from Kathy Ruffing, who has concentrated in this area
for the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities after twenty-five years at the
Congressional Budget Office, where she analyzed a wide range of topics including
interest costs and federal debt, federal pay, immigration, and Social Security. She
advises that an adjustment must be made because the Budget Control Act included
a special “cap adjustment” for such activities. These cap adjustments set aside a
limited amount of money that Congress can use solely to increase SSA funding for
program integrity purposes, which include CDRs and SSI redeterminations of
financial eligibility. These limited funding increases do not require offsetting
reductions in other non-defense appropriations; in effect, such increases are outside
the statutory caps on annual non-defense appropriations that the Budget Control
Act established. . See Ruffing, Social Security Disability Insurance Is Vital to
Workers With Severe Impairments, supra note 21. Subsequent papers cover that
demographic changes account for the bulk of the program's growth, while some
other analyses appear to tell a different story. These differences largely reflect
variations in the measure of DI growth that the studies use, the factors considered,
and the time period analyzed. Thus, there is no single correct answer to "how much
of DI's growth stems from demographic factors?" Kathy Ruffing, How Much of the
Growth in Disability Insurance Stems from Demographic Changes? CTR. ON
BUDGET
AND
POLICY
PRIORITIES
(Jan.
27,
2014),
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=4080.
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funded through discretionary appropriations in 2016 because the cap
adjustment was fully funded for 2015.122
Many impairments are progressive and, as people age, the
probability for improvement lessens. For most claims, SSA uses a
Medical Improvement Review Standard (MIRS), which requires that
the agency must show medical improvement before benefits can be
terminated.123
SSA shall terminate disability benefits “only if such finding is
supported by:
(1)Substantial evidence which demonstrates that—
(A)There has been any medical improvement in the individual’s
impairment or combination of impairments (other than medical
improvement which is not related to the individual’s ability to work),
and
(B)The individual is now able to engage in substantial gainful
activity.


Among the issues for evaluation at the time a claim is filed are
the nature of the alleged impairment and the age and occupational
experience of the claimant.124 Some impairments can be controlled or
even cured. However, to any reasonable degree of probability, CDRs
are more effective for younger claimants than older.125 People are

In a joint resolution, S. Con 11, setting forth the congressional budget for
the United States Government for FY2016 and setting forth the appropriate
budgetary levels for FY2017 through 2025. See Table 2.
 ! Congress passed the standard as part of the Social Security Disability
Benefits Reform Act of 1984 (DBRA 1984; Pub. L. No. 98-460) – legislation
passed by a unanimous, bipartisan vote in both the House of Representatives (4020) and the Senate (99-0) in September 1984, and was enacted when signed by
President Reagan on October 9, 1984. See also, Soc. Sec. Act §§ 223(f),
1614(a)(4); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(f), 1382c(a)(4). A number of exceptions to
application of the MIRS were provided in the legislation, including cases where the
prior decision was “in error.” If fraud was involved, benefits can be terminated
retroactively and the individual may be referred for further sanctions.
 " Standards for Consultative Examinations and Existing Medical Evidence,
Final Rules; 56 FR 36932, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Aug. 1, 1991),
https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/hallex/II-04/II-4-1-2.html.
 # The typical DI beneficiary is in his or her late fifties (0% are over age fifty,
and 30% are sixty or older) and suffers from a severe mental, musculoskeletal, or
other debilitating impairment. Age data for December 2011, from the Social
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roughly twice as likely to be disabled at age fifty as at age forty, and
twice as likely to be disabled at age sixty as at age fifty.126 MIRS
does not apply to SSA Age-eighteen Redetermination cases.127
After a recipient qualifies as disabled, SSA is required to conduct
periodic CDRs to determine whether the individual continues to be
disabled. However, SSA generally cannot find an individual’s
disability has ended without finding medical improvement has
occurred. As such, diaries are set for six to eighteen months when
improvement is expected, up to three years when improvement is possible,
128
and five to seven years when improvement is not expected. 

Security
Beneficiary
Data,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/beniesQuery.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2016);
diagnostic data from Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability
Insurance
Program,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.
(2011),
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/2011/sect01c.pdf. Nearly onequarter of beneficiaries lack a high school diploma, and only ten percent have a
four-year college degree and labor-market prospects for such applicants are poor.
See Ruffing, Social Security Disability Insurance is Vital to Workers with Severe
Impairments, supra note 21, at 4. “Program’s Growth Largely Due to Demographic
Factors; Financing Should Be Addressed as Part of Overall Solvency”.
 $ See Chart below. Source: CBPP based on data from the Social Security
Administration, Office of the Chief Actuary.

 % DI 33025.075 Age 18 Redetermination Cases Under P.L. 104-193, SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.
(Feb.
22,
2013),
https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0433025075.
 & Examining Ways Social Security Can Improve the Disability Review
Process,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.
(Apr.
9,
2014),
http://oig.ssa.gov/newsroom/congressional-testimony/april9.
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If the recipient’s medical condition has improved and the
recipient is no longer disabled according to its guidelines, SSA
ceases benefits.129 There are several exceptions, including:
•Advances in medical or vocational therapy or technology,130
•Vocational therapy (any additional education or training that
improves the individual’s ability to meet the vocational requirements
of more jobs),131
•New or improved diagnostic or evaluative techniques, and132
•Substantial evidence demonstrates that any prior disability
decision was made in error.133
Procedural exceptions also include:
•Fraud or similar fault,134
•Failure to cooperate or whereabouts unknown,135 and

 '

Id.
DI 28020.100 Advances in Medical or Vocational Therapy or Technology,
SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Sep. 4, 2015), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0428020100.
! 28020.150 Vocational Therapy, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Sep. 4, 2015),
https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0428020150.
! DI 28020.250 New or Improved Diagnostic or Evaluative Techniques, SOC.
SEC. ADMIN. (Sep. 4, 2015), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0428020250.
!! 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594.
!" Fraud exists when a claimant (or any other person acting on the claimant’s
behalf) with intent to defraud either makes or causes to be made a false statement
or a misrepresentation of a material fact for use in determining rights to Title II or
XVI benefits; or conceals or fails to disclose a material fact for use in determining
rights to Title II or XVI benefits. Similar fault does not require fraudulent intent. It
exists when a claimant or any other person either knowingly makes an incorrect or
incomplete statement that is material to the determination or knowingly conceals
information that is material to the determination. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(e)(1),
416.994(b)(4)(i). SSA maintains a Cooperative Disability Investigations (CDI)
Program, to investigate DI and SSI claims that state disability examiners believe
are suspicious. The CDI program’s primary mission is to obtain evidence that can
resolve questions of fraud before benefits are ever paid. CDI Units also provide
reports to DDS examiners during CDRs that can be used to cease benefits of inpayment beneficiaries.
!# A failure to cooperate or whereabouts unknown issue may arise at any
point during a CDR when a disabled individual does not furnish medical or other
evidence, fails to attend a consultative examination by a certain date, or cannot be
located. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(e)(2)-(3), 416.994(b)(4)(ii)-(iii).
!
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•Failure to follow prescribed treatment.136
Medical CDRs declined by 65% from FY2004 to 2008, resulting
in a significant backlog.137 According to Inspector General (IG)
reports, SSA would have saved at least $556 million during calendar
year 2011 had SSA had conducted the medical CDRs in the backlog
when they were due.138 Had CDRs been initiated in 2004, when the
appropriations and the concentration on CDRs diminished, it is
reasonable that the solvency of the DI fund would have been
extended beyond the expected 2016 drop-dead date.139
It is reasonable that the five to seven years evaluation for those
whose improvement is not expected means that most claimants near
“advanced age” should not be re-evaluated. However, for those who
became disabled when they were younger, evaluation should yield a
huge return on the investment, i.e. appropriations targeted to this
group.
For FY2014, under the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014,
SSA received about $1.2 billion in dedicated program integrity
funding, and recent information received from the Agency suggests
that it planned to complete 510,000 medical CDRs.140
SSA has preliminarily reported it would need $11.8 billion in
funding over the next ten years to eliminate the medical CDR
backlog by FY2018 and prevent its recurrence through FY2023.141
!$

If treatment can restore the ability to work, an individual must follow
prescribed treatment to receive benefits. If prescribed treatment is not followed
without good cause, SSA should cease benefits when performing a CDR. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1594(e)(4), 416.994(b)(4)(iv).
!% Statement of Inspector Gen. O'Carroll Jr., supra, note 112.
!& Id.
!' The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996 authorized
additional funds for CDRs but only for fiscal year (FY) 1996 through FY2002. In
FY2003, the additional funding for CDRs lapsed and SSA shifted its focus away
from CDRs toward processing the growing number of initial disability claims. As a
result, the number of
medical CDRs performed by SSA dropped from an all-time high of 876,802 in
FY2000 to 207,637 in FY2007, before climbing back up to 443,233 in FY2012.
Morton, supra note 9 at 6 (citing Social Security Administration, Performance and
Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2003, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Nov. 10, 2003),
http://www.ssa.gov/finance/.
" Id.
" Examining Ways Social Security Can Improve the Disability Review
Process, supra note 128.
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Under this scenario, the DI fund can be salvaged.142 In order to
expedite savings to the DI Trust Fund, resources should initially be
directed only to those younger individuals who received an award at
“Step 5” of the sequential evaluation, those who do not have a
condition that meets or equals a listed impairment.143 The CDR
program should also be integrated with certain return to work
initiatives discussed more fully below that could target those who can
easily be returned to work while increasing the efficiency of
"

Id.
See Bernard Wixon & Alexander Strand, Identifying SSA's Sequential
Disability Determination Steps Using Administrative Data, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Jun.
2013), http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/rsnotes/rsn2013-01.html.
From Table, 1, the following
process is extracted:
gp
"!

Step 3: Meets or equals
the Listings?

330,383 13.6

A1

Allow

Impairment meets the Listings

271,278 11.1

B1

Allow

Impairment equals the Listings

59,105 2.4

H1

Deny

Capacity for SGA, past relevant work—ER/PP met

448,993 18.4

H2

Deny

Capacity for SGA, past relevant work—ER/PP not
met

50,245 2.1

Allow

Medical vocational considerations

408,301 16.8

D1

Allow

Medical vocational considerations—arduous
unskilled work

310 0.0

G1

Deny

Capacity for SGA, vocational considerations—
reentitlement period met

34,131 1.4

G2

Deny

Capacity for SGA, vocational considerations—
reentitlement period not met

1,225 0.1

J1

Deny

Capacity for SGA, other work—ER/PP met

529,680 21.7

J2

Deny

Capacity for SGA, other work—ER/PP not met

68,975 2.8

Step 4: Capacity for past
work?

499,238 20.5

Step 5: Capacity for any
work?
C1

1,042,622 42.8

ER = expedited reinstatement;
PP = provisional period.
“If an adult is not actually working and his impairment matches or is
equivalent to a listed impairment, he is presumed unable to work and is awarded
benefits without a determination whether he actually can perform his own prior
work or other work.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 532 (1990). “If the claimant
wins at the third step (a listed impairment), she must be held disabled, and the case
is over.” Jones v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 2003); See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(d) (“If you have an impairment(s) which meets the duration requirement
and is listed in appendix 1 or is equal to a listed impairment(s), we will find you
disabled without considering your age, education, and work experience.” Id.
(emphasis added).
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adjudication. E.g., fewer resources would be needed to effectuate the
adjudication process for those who do not qualify for vocational
rehabilitation (VR) programs.
However, added funding for the CDR program is a low risk
investment that should be pursued vigorously.


III.RECOMMENDATION 3: TAKE ADVANTAGE OF RETURN-TO-WORK
INCENTIVES.
SSA should proactively offer rehabilitation services to every
applicant and beneficiary for DI.
Legislation recently offered would amend the Act to authorize the
Commissioner to give individuals denied OASDI and SSI benefits
based on an adverse determination of disability any information on
appropriate public or private entities that provide employment
services, vocational rehabilitation services, or other support
services.144 In some states, this is already standard operating
procedure.145
Another bill would mandate that SSA develop public online tools
to assist beneficiaries.146 These tools would permit individuals
eligible for disability benefits to assess the impact of earnings on the
individual's eligibility for, and amount of, benefits received through
Federal and State benefit programs.
I would support both. However, more importantly, agency
rulemaking to address current law is required that would be more
effective. For example, although 20 C.F.R. Section 416.1710 referral
"" Promoting Opportunity for Disability Benefit Applicants Act, H.R.2135,
114th Cong. (2015-2016).
"# See discussion of the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, as amended, infra, 29
U.S.C. 943, et seq. Every American is entitled to use employment services. The
Act is implemented through DOL, Employment and Training Administration
regulations, 20 C.F.R. Part 652 and Parts 660 through 671. See also Stapleton and
Martin, Table B.1., in Appendix B Percentage of the 2002 New VR Applicant
Cohort Ever Awarded SSD at Application, from Application to Closure, and from
Closure to 60 Months After Application, by State of Application. See also, the
Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) (discussed in more detail,
infra.) effective July 1, 2015, requires Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) and programs under the Second Chance Act to be mandatory partners in a
mandatory “One-Stop” VR system. This would include SSI applicants but may not
include many DI applicants.
"$ Promoting Opportunity Through Informed Choice Act, H.R. 1795, 114th
Cong. (2015).
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for state vocational rehabilitation services (VR) exists “on the
books,” it is not enforced and there is no equivalent in the DI
regulations:147
Whom we refer and when:
(a) Whom we refer: If you are 16 years of age or older and under
65 years old, and receiving SSI benefits, we will refer you to the
State agency providing vocational rehabilitation services. If you are
under age 16, we will refer you to an agency administering services
under the Maternal and Child Health Services (Title V) Block Grant
Act.148
(b) When we refer: We will make this referral when we find you
eligible for benefits or at any other time that we find you might be
helped by vocational rehabilitation services.149
SSA should expand it for Title II claims and enforce this
provision for certain younger individuals.150 This is especially true
because the percentage of DI allowances based on vocational,
educational, and age-specific factors increased from 28 percent to 47
percent in the ten years prior to 2009.151 It is reasonable that the
mathematical progression for current claims has held and there is
increased need to evaluate vocational factors.
Please note that although a claimant may not be able to return to
past relevant work at Step 4 of the sequential evaluation and at Step 5
vocational evidence shows that there are no “other” jobs a claimant
can perform under current guidelines, SSA does not apply the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) principles in rendering a
determination.152 Because some of the claimants cannot return to

"%

20 C.F.R. § 416.1110.
20 C.F.R. 416.1710(a).
"' 20 C.F.R. 416.1710(b).
# According to recent statistics, of the nearly 9 million disabled workers
receiving benefits in 2012, the most recent year for which data is available, 193,042
recipients tried working, according to SSA, to be taken off. Joseph Lawler, GOP
plans overhaul for Social Security disability, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 23, 2015),
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/gop-plans-overhaul-for-social-securitydisability/article/2560440.
# Wixon & Strand, supra 143.
# SSR 83046c: Sections 216(i) and 224(d) (42 U.S.C. 416(i) and 423(d))
Disability Insurance Benefits – Inability to Perform Previous Work –
Administrative Notice Under the Medial-Vocational Guidelines of the Existence of
Other
Work,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.,
"&
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work, they may be entitled to an accommodation under the ADA.153
According to the DOL Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in 2013,
17.6 percent of persons with a disability were employed.154 In
contrast, the employment-population ratio for those without a
disability was 64.0 percent.155 The employment-population ratio was
little changed from 2012 to 2013 for both groups.156 The
unemployment rate for those with a disability was 13.2 percent in
https://www.socialsecurity.gov/OP_Home/rulings/di/02/SSR83-46-di-02.html (last
visited Apr. 7, 2016).
#! The ADA prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities in
employment, transportation, public accommodation, communications, and
governmental activities. The ADA also establishes requirements for
telecommunications relay services.
DOL’s Office of Disability Employment Policy (ODEP) provides publications
and other technical assistance on the basic requirements of the ADA. It does not
enforce any part of the law.
In addition to the Department of Labor, four federal agencies enforce the
ADA:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforces
regulations covering employment.
The Department of Transportation enforces regulations governing
transit.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) enforces
regulations covering telecommunication services.
The Department of Justice enforces regulations governing public
accommodations and state and local government services.
Another federal agency, the Architectural and Transportation Barriers
Compliance Board (ATBCB), also known as the Access Board, issues
guidelines to ensure that buildings, facilities, and transit vehicles are
accessible and usable by people with disabilities.
Two agencies within the Department of Labor enforce portions of the ADA.
•The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) has
coordinating authority under the employment-related provisions of the
ADA.
•The Civil Rights Center is responsible for enforcing Title II of the
ADA as it applies to the labor- and workforce-related practices of state
and local governments and other public entities. See the Laws &
Regulations subtopic for specific information on these provisions.
Americans
with
Disabilities
Act,
DEPT.
OF
LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/disability/ada.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
#" News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Persons with a Disability: Labor
Force
Characteristics
2013
(Jun.
11,
2014),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/disabl_06112014.pdf.
## Id.
#$ Id.
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2013, higher than the rate for persons with no disability (7.1
percent).157 The jobless rate for persons with a disability was little
changed from 2012 to 2013, while the rate for those without a
disability declined.158
Although the BLS statistics do not consider those eligible for DI,
and does not show whether employers of the disabled need to
accommodate an impairment, for many disabled people, an
accommodation could return them to the current job and potentially
provide a more lucrative occupational setting than in former work.159
Please consider the following:
A.The Public Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) program funded
under Title I of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is the primary Federal
program assisting individuals with disabilities in securing
competitive employment.160 This program is not the exclusive
domain of the DI and SSI systems, although beneficiaries may take
advantage of them.
B.In 1992, Congress mandated a longitudinal study of VR.161
The results demonstrated that:
•69% of VR consumers achieved employment as a result of VR
services and 75% of those were working at jobs in the competitive
labor market.

#%

Id.
Economic News Release, Bureau of Labor and Statistics, Persons with a
Disability: Labor Force Characteristics Summary- 2014,(Jun. 16, 2015),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/disabl.nr0.htm. The data on persons with a
disability are collected as part of the Current Population Survey (CPS), a monthly
sample survey of about 60,000 households that provides information on
employment and unemployment in the United States. The Department of Labor’s
Office of Disability Employment Policy sponsors the collection of data on persons
with a disability.
#' Id.
$ See also Public Vocational Rehabilitation Before the H. Comm. on Edu.
And Labor, Subcomm. on Higher Edu., Life Long Learning and Competativeness
(2009) (statement of Steve Wooderson, Admn’r. Iowa Vocational Rehab Servs.),
http://democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/sites/democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/fil
es/documents/111/pdf/testimony/20090212StephenWoodersonTestimony.pdf.
$ REHABILITATION SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (RSA), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION UNDER CONTRACT NO. HR92022001(1992).
#&
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•20.7% of VR consumers utilized assistive technology
(specialized computerized devices, portable speech synthesizers,
special software, etc.) in helping to enter the workforce.
•Three years after job placement, 76% continued to be employed
and received increases in salary and benefits.
•Consumers earned an average of $7.33/hour; rate increased to
$9.62/hour after three years (minimum wage is $5.15/hour)
•Among individuals who completed VR services, 44% no longer
needed public assistance.162
C.Applicants are supposed to be told that they may contact the
rehabilitation agency in their state directly at any time:
a.The literature states: Your Social Security office will be glad to
provide the location and phone number of the nearest office of the
state vocational rehabilitation agency. Individuals then can let the
agency know of their interest in receiving rehabilitation services to
help them return to work. The address and phone number of the state
vocational rehabilitation agency also can be found in the phone
book.163
b.However, this is not performed in many states.
c.It is usually directed to recipients rather than applicants.164
D.In order to expedite large numbers of cases, the sequential
evaluation, for DI claims involving adult claimants is:
Step 1. An individual who is working and engaging in substantial
gainful activity will not be found to be disabled regardless of medical
findings.165

$

Id.
See Working While Disabled—How We Can HELP, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.
(2015), http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10095.pdf.
$"See What You Need To Know When You Get Social Security Disability
Benefits, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (2011), http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/EN-0510153.pdf.
See also Working While Disabled, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/EN-05-10095.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2016);
SSA
2015
Red
Book,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.
(2015),
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/redbook/documents/TheRedBook2015.pdf.
$# 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b) (2012).
$!
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Step 2. An individual who does not have a “severe impairment”
will not be found disabled.166
Step 3. If an individual is not working and is suffering from a
severe impairment which meets the duration requirement and which
"meets or equals” a listed impairment in “Appendix 1" of Subpart P
of Regulations No. 4, a finding of disabled will be made without
consideration of vocational factors.167
•Appendix 1 contains a listing of impairments.
Step 4. If an individual is capable of performing work he or she
has done in the past, a finding of "not disabled" must be made.168
Step 5. If an individual's impairment is so severe as to preclude
the performance of past work, other factors including age, education,
past work experience and residual functional capacity must be
considered to determine if other work can be performed:169
a.The “grid” rules set out in Appendix 2 of the Regulations are
considered in determining whether a claimant with exertional
impairments170 is or is not disabled.171 The regulations also provide

$$

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) (2012).
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii) (2012).
$& 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) (2012).
$' 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v) (2012).
% Exertional. i.e. strength, categories:
•Sedentary work involves lifting no more than ten pounds at a time
and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and
small tools. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a).
•Light work involves lifting no more than twenty pounds at a time
with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to ten pounds. See
Id. at § 404.1567(b).
•Medium work involves lifting no more than fifty pounds at a time
with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to twenty-five
pounds. See Id. at § 404.1567(c).
•Heavy work involves lifting no more than 100 pounds at a time with
frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to fifty pounds. See Id.
at § 404.1567(d).
•Very heavy work involves lifting objects weighing more than 100
pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing fifty
pounds or more. See Id. § 404.1567(e).
% The Medical-Vocational Guidelines are a matrix system for handling
claims that involve substantially uniform levels of impairment. See 20 C.F.R. §
Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 2. These guidelines are commonly known as the grids or
tables that give a finding of disabled or not disabled for various combinations of
age, education, and work experience. The grids provide a uniform conclusion about
$%
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that if an individual suffers from a non-exertional impairment as well
as an exertional impairment, both are considered in determining
residual functional capacity.172 Residual functional capacity is the
most a claimant can still do despite limitations.173
b.The grids categorize jobs by their physical-exertional
requirements and consist of three separate tables, one table for each
category (sedentary work, light work, and medium work).174 If a
claimant is found able to work the full range of heavy work this
“generally is sufficient for a finding of not disabled.”175 Each grid
presents various combinations of factors relevant to a claimant’s
ability to find work. The factors in the grids are the claimant’s age,176
education, and work experience.177 For each combination of these
factors, e.g., fifty years old, limited education, and unskilled work
experience, the grids direct a finding of either disabled or not
disabled based on the number of jobs in the national economy in that
category of physical-exertional requirements.178 This approach
allows the Commissioner to streamline the administrative process
and encourages uniform treatment of claims.179
c.If a finding of disabled cannot be made based on strength
limitations alone, the rules established in Appendix 2 are used as a
framework in evaluating disability.180 In cases where the individual
has solely a non-exertional impairment, a determination as to whether
disability exists shall be based on the principles in the appropriate
sections of the regulations, giving consideration to the rules for
specific case situations in Appendix 2.181
the availability of jobs for all persons whose medical condition is categorized in the
same way.
% 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2.
%! Id.
%" See Exertional categories, supra note 170.
%# 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2.
%$ The grids consider three age categories: younger person (under age fifty),
person closely approaching advanced age (age 50-54), and eighteen person of
advanced age (age fifty-five or older).
%% 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2.
%& Id.
%' Id.
& Id.
& See Daniel F. Solomon, Vocational Testimony in Social Security Hearings,
18
J.
NAT’L
ASS’N
ADMIN.
L.
JUDGES
(1998)
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol18/iss2/2.
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d.If claimant’s limitations are only non-exertional, the grids are
inappropriate, and determination must rely on other evidence.182 If
claimant’s limitations are both exertional and non-exertional, the
determination is supposed to consult the grids first.183 If the claimant
is disabled under the grids, there is no need to examine the effect of
the non-exertional limitations.184 But if the same claimant may be not
disabled under the grids, the non-exertional limitations must be
examined separately.185
E.A claimant can be determined to be disabled at steps 3 or 5.186
At step 5 in the adult sequential evaluation the burden shifts from the
claimant to SSA to show that considering age, education, past work
experience and residual functional capacity other work can be
performed that is substantial gainful employment, which exists in the
regional or national economy.187 Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566, work
that exists in the national economy is defined:
&

20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2.
Id.
&" Id.
&# Id.
&$ Wixon & Strand, supra 143
&% See, e.g., Cannon v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 1541, 1544 (11th Cir. 1988). At the
hearing level, an administrative law judge must articulate specific jobs that the
claimant is able to perform, and this finding must be supported by substantial
evidence. (emphasis added.) Although rarely used at the DDS level, Vocational
Experts (VEs) are used by administrative law judges at the hearing level to help
determine step five of the sequential evaluation to in help determine the ability to
perform other appropriate work in the labor market. VEs respond to hypothetical
questions proposed by the judges and claimants’ representatives based on a
hypothetical individual’s: age, education, work experience, skills and their residual
functional capacity; See also Vocational and Medical Experts (Vocational Expert
and Medical Expert Fees for Services, Office of the Inspector General of the Social
Security Administration (A-06-99-51005) (2001). In FY1999 the SSA Office of
Hearing and Appeals (currently the SSA Office of Disability Adjudication and
Review, ODAR) had Blanket Purchase Agreements with 1,337 Vocational Experts
and had made $21.6 million dollars in payments to Vocational Experts. These
payments represented 3.1% of the $687 million operating budget in 1999. See also
Solomon, Vocational Testimony in Social Security Hearings, supra note 181. SSA
has signed an interagency agreement with the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS). More detailed information about the agreement see
Occupational
Information
System
Project,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/disabilityresearch/occupational_info_systems.html (last visited
Apr. 7, 2016). Hypothetically, a new Occupational Information System (OIS) to
update and/or replace the DOT is being developed.
&!
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(a)General. We consider that work exists in the national economy
when it exists in significant numbers either in the region where you
live or in several other regions of the country. It does not matter
whether—
(1) Work exists in the immediate area in which you live;
(2) A specific job vacancy exists for you; or
(3) You would be hired if you applied for work.
(b) How we determine the existence of work. Work exists in the
national economy when there is a significant number of jobs (in one
or more occupations) having requirements which you are able to
meet with your physical or mental abilities and vocational
qualifications. Isolated jobs that exist only in very limited numbers in
relatively few locations outside of the region where you live are not
considered “work which exists in the national economy.” We will not
deny you disability benefits on the basis of the existence of these
kinds of jobs. If work that you can do does not exist in the national
economy, we will determine that you are disabled. However, if work
that you can do does exist in the national economy, we will
determine that you are not disabled.
(c) Inability to obtain work. We will determine that you are not
disabled if your residual functional capacity and vocational abilities
make it possible for you to do work which exists in the national
economy, but you remain unemployed because of:
(1) Your inability to get work;
(2) Lack of work in your local area;
(3) The hiring practices of employers;
(4) Technological changes in the industry in which you have
worked;
(5) Cyclical economic conditions;
(6) No job openings for you;
(7) You would not actually be hired to do work you could
otherwise do; or
(8) You do not wish to do a particular type of work.

178

$!# #""#"#!#% & $"

,-'*

(d) Administrative notice of job data. When we determine that
unskilled, sedentary, light, and medium jobs exist in the national
economy (in significant numbers either in the region where you live
or in several regions of the country), we will take administrative
notice of reliable job information available from various
governmental and other publications. For example, we will take
notice of:
(1) Dictionary of Occupational Titles, published by the
Department of Labor;
(2) County Business Patterns, published by the Bureau of the
Census;
(3) Census Reports, also published by the Bureau of the Census;
(4) Occupational Analyses, prepared for the Social Security
Administration by various State employment agencies; and
(5) Occupational Outlook Handbook, published by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics.
(e) Use of vocational experts and other specialists. If the issue in
determining whether you are disabled is whether your work skills can
be used in other work and the specific occupations in which they can
be used, or there is a similarly complex issue, we may use the
services of a vocational expert or other specialist. We will decide
whether to use a vocational expert or other specialist.188
When issued in 1980, the Medical-Vocational Guidelines were
largely supported by the DOT.189 The DOT is supposed to identify
jobs that claimants might be able to perform in light of their
functional limitations and vocational characteristics. Unfortunately, it
was last updated in 1991 and is most probably flawed.190
If there are a significant number of jobs either in the region where
the claimant lives or in several other regions of the country that
match the claimant’s medical and vocational profile, then the
claimant is “not disabled.” However, it is inappropriate to conclude
that an older (typically age 50 and above) claimant can transfer to a
&&

20 C.F.R. § 404.1566.
20 C.F.R. § 404(P)(2).
' Although the Department of Labor replaced DOT with the Occupational
Information Network (O*NET)—SSA determined O*Net does not contain
definitive job information. Also, by all accounts, vocational profiles of claimants at
the DDS level are often inaccurate.
&'
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different job in a wholly different industry that requires more than a
minimal adjustment. If there are no jobs that claimant could perform
at step 5 of the sequential evaluation, or if such jobs do not exist in
sufficient numbers, then SSA has not met the shifting burden and
claimant is “disabled.”191
F.Trial work period. After a person becomes eligible for
disability benefits, the person may attempt to return to the work
force.192 As an incentive, SSA provides a trial work period in which a
beneficiary may have earnings and still collect benefits.193 During a
trial work period, a recipient may test an ability to work and still be
considered disabled.194 Services performed during the trial work
period that would normally show the disability has ended are not
considered until services have been performed for at least 9 months
(not necessarily consecutive) in a rolling 60-month period.195 In
2015, any month in which earnings exceed $780 is considered a
month of services for an individual's trial work period.196
G.Ticket to Work. SSA administers a voluntary VR program for
persons aged 18 through 64 who already are in payment status.197
The program permits recipients to keep benefits while they explore
employment, receive vocational rehabilitation services, and gain
work experience. Cash benefits and Medicaid or Medicare often
continue throughout a transition to work, and there are protections in
place to help regain benefits if the recipient is unable to continue

' Tom Johns, SSA’s Sequential Evaluation Process for Assessing Disability,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/oidap/Documents/Social%20Security%20Administration.%20
%20SSAs%20Sequential%20Evaluation.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
'
Substantial Gainful Activity, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., (2016),
https://www.socialsecurity.gov/oact/cola/sga.html.
'! Id.
'"
Trial
Work
Period,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/twp.html. (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
'#
SSA
2016
Red
Book,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.
(2016),
https://www.ssa.gov/redbook/eng/ssdi-only-employment-supports.htm.
'$ Trial Work Period, supra note 194.
'% The SSA Ticket Act created two other programs, the Work Incentives
Planning and Assistance (WIPA) program and the Protection and Advocacy for
Beneficiaries of Social Security (PABSS) program, to supplement the assistance
available at our field offices. The two programs authorize grants to organizations
with ties to the disability community at the local level. 20 C.F.R. § 411.
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working due to disability.198 SSA maintains an Office of Research,
Demonstration, and Employment Support, which conducts research
and analysis, administers employment support programs, and
develops agency policies on work incentives.199 Unfortunately, this
Office is underfunded and did not provide much support until
recently.200
H.Meanwhile, SSA is supposed to determine whether VR will aid
a willing recipient.
I.SSA states that for every dollar spent on VR, it receives $7 in
return. According to the Council of State Administrators of
Vocational Rehabilitation, the individuals who completed their VR
service plans in 2012 and went to work earned approximately $3.5
billion in wages during their first year of work.201 During that year,
these new wage earners paid approximately $320 million in federal
taxes; $95 million in state income taxes; and $520 million in Social
Security and Medicare taxes (self and employer). These individuals
will be able to pay back the cost of their rehabilitation services,
through taxes, in just two to four years. In addition, many of these
individuals will generate projected savings to the Federal Treasury
and the Social Security Trust Fund of a projected $470.3 million in
savings for one fiscal year.202
J.However, the SSA statistics are based on only those already
awarded benefits whereas the most effective time to address work is
at the time of application, before an applicant is in payment status.

'&

See Scott D. Szymendera & William R. Morton, About Ticket to Work,
RESEARCH
SERV.
RL33585
(2014),
CONG.
http://www.chooseworkttw.net/about/index.html.
''
Organization
Chart
&
Structure,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/disabilityresearch/organization.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).

See Accelerated Benefits Demonstration, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/disabilityresearch/accelerated.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
See also SSA 2016 Red Book supra note 194 (providing more information on
SSA’s demonstration projects).


See Public Vocational Rehabilitation: An Investment In America, COUNCIL
STATE
ADM’R
OF
VOCATIONAL
REHAB.
(Jul.
9,
2013),
http://www.rehabnetwork.org/?s=an+investment+in+America&submit=. See also
Investing in America: 2013-2014,, COUNCIL OF STATE ADM’R OF VOCATIONAL
REHAB., http://www.rehabnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/Investing-in-Americabrochure-2013-2014.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
 Id.
OF
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SSA once developed a plan to conduct a test of early intervention
services provided by state VR agencies to applicants as part of a
broader early intervention test, but that plan was not pursued.203 For
every dollar spent, SSA would get thousands back. Some researchers
believe that savings could be in the billions of dollars. This, standing
alone, could make the DI system solvent.204
K.Moreover, there are no statistics to show the effect of the
application of VR principles on CDR claimants. It could be that VR
is being applied, but there is no evidence to substantiate it.
L.Social Security administers a Vocational Rehabilitation (VR)
Reimbursement Program.205 The following is a summary of the
reimbursements Social Security made to State VR agencies by fiscal
year206


!

In fact, SSA ran a study in 2001-2003 with the Disability Research
Institute, a research consortium. “Early intervention” was offered to a sample of
applicants with “impairments that may reasonably be presumed to be disabling
(i.e., they have a good chance at being approved Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI) benefits) and who are likely to engage in Substantial Gainful
Activity (SGA) as a result of the features of early intervention.” See DEBRA
BRUCKER, EARLY INTERVENTION PROJECT: YEAR TWO REPORT, PROGRAM FOR
DISABILITY RESEARCH, RUTGERS UNIV. (2002). A review of the report shows that
it took Rutgers two years to discover that the Department of Labor (DOL) offered a
“one-stop” or career center offices that could perform the entire function.
" David C. Stapleton & Frank Martin, Vocational Rehabilitation on the Road
to Social Security Disability: Longitudinal Statistics from Matched Administrative
Data Vocational Rehabilitation on the Road to Social Security Disability:
Longitudinal Statistics from Matched Administrative Data, in MICHIGAN
RETIREMENT RESEARCH CENTER RESEARCH PAPER 2012-269 (2012).
# Vocational Rehabilitation Cost Reimbursement Program, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/work/vocational_rehab.html (last visited Apr. 7,
2016).
$ See State Vocational Rehabilitation Agency Reimbursements, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN, http://www.ssa.gov/work/claimsprocessing.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
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Fiscal
Year*
FY 14
FY 13
FY 12
FY 11
FY 10
FY 09
FY 08
FY 07
FY 06
FY 05
FY 04
FY 03
FY 02
FY 01
FY 00
FY 99
FY 98

Claims
Allowed
9,451
9,645
5,343
4,679
7,768
8,712
9,325
6,871
8,387
6,095
6,811
6,760
10,527
8,208
10,220
11,126
9,950

Dollars
Allowed
$141,449,760.46
$138,260,580.10
$78,768,058.10
$72,991,906.25
$105,964,398.60
$122,268,833.39
$124,238,549.09
$90,263,129.56
$105,049,203.20
$75,635,939.94
$85,172,425.42
$84,599,189.87
$131,062,205.10
$103,892,717.86
$117,024,222.20
$119,934,831.23
$103,037,127.54

,-'*

Average Cost
Per Claim
$14,966.64
$14,334.95
$14,742.29
$15,599.89
$13,641.14
$14,035
$13,323
$13,137
$12,525
$12,410
$12,505
$12,514
$12,450
$12,657
$11,451
$10,780
$10,355

These figures show that more emphasis on VR was attributed for
years prior to the Bush administration (when there were
proportionally fewer DI beneficiaries) and prior to declines in the DI
Trust Fund. It is reasonable that the emphasis on VR contributed to
surpluses in the DI Trust Fund for those periods. It is also reasonable
that the decreased emphasis from 2004 onward contributed to the
decline in the DI Fund.
M.Meanwhile, in addition to the SSA VR system, every state has
a mandated multi-funded VR program.207 The 1998 Workforce

% A federal–state VR program partnership, administered by the federal U.S.
Department of Education Rehabilitation Services Administration (RSA), currently
gives approximately $3 billion annually to state agencies to provide a wide variety
of vocational rehabilitation services to individuals with a broad spectrum of
disabling conditions. These funds are not specifically dedicated for SSID and SSI
applicants. E.g., David Dean, John V. Pepper, Robert M. Schmidt, & Steven Stern,
State Vocational Rehabilitation Programs and Federal Disability Insurance: An
Analysis of Virginia’s Vocational Rehabilitation Program, IZA J. LAB. POL’Y
(2014). The researchers concluded, first, VR services are associated with lower
rates of participation in disability insurance programs - a nearly two point drop in
SSDI receipt and one point drop in SSI receipt. Second, VR service receipt is
associated with lower take-up rates of SSDI/SSI. Finally, among VR applicants on
SSDI/SSI, those who receive substantive VR services are more likely to be
employed.
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Investment Act (WIA) was intended to incorporate a myriad of
federal job training programs into a coordinated, comprehensive
system.208 States were required to develop statewide and local plans
that included the VR system in the planning process.209 Although
Congress contemplated merging the VR system into the WIA, VR is
maintained as a separate program by several agencies to meet the
vocational training needs of people with disabilities.210 But, the
vocational training opportunities of the state workforce investment
system are clearly intended to be available to individuals with
disabilities.211 The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 was
reauthorized July 14, 2014 as P.L. 113-128, the Workforce
Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA).212 Any service an
individual receives from the VR system must be connected to an
ultimate employment goal.213 People must show a mental, physical or
learning disability that interferes with the ability to work.214 The
disability need not qualify the person for DI or SSI benefits, but it
must be a substantial impediment to employment.215
N.Among the programs involved under WIOA are: Title I of the
Act, Adult, Dislocated Worker and Youth programs216; Adult

& The Workforce Investment Act of 1998: A Primer for People with
Disabilities Development, JOHN J. HELDRICH CTR. FOR WORKFORCE (1999),
https://labor.ny.gov/workforcenypartners/PDFs/WIA-Primer-Disabilities.pdf.
' Id.
 Id.
 See 29 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)(A).
 H.R. 803, 113th Cong. (2013).
! See 29 U.S.C. § 722(a)(1) (2014).
" 29 U.S.C § 705(20)(a) (2014).
# 29 C.F.R. § 722(a)(3). Although VR services may be denied if a person
cannot benefit from them, a person is presumed capable of employment, despite the
severity of a disability, unless the VR agency shows by clear and convincing
evidence that he or she cannot benefit from services. Id.; see also 34 C.F.R. §
361.42(a)(2).
$ According to this provision, priority access to higher-intensity career
services and training
must be given to public assistance recipients, other low-income individuals,
and individuals who are basic skills
deficient. Previously, under WIA, local policies on priority of service varied
widely.
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Education and Literacy programs; the Wagner-Peyser Employment
Service; and VR: Title I of the Rehabilitation Act programs.217
O.In addition to SSA and Department of Education (DOE)
involvement, DOL provides grants for re-entry into the job market.218
Because some of the claimants cannot return to past relevant work,
they may be entitled to an accommodation under the American
Disabilities Act (ADA).219 DOL maintains a Job Accommodation

%
WIOA
Overview,
U.S.
DEPT.
OF
LABOR,
https://www.doleta.gov/wioa/Overview.cfm (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
&
See JAN'S SOAR INFORMATION SYSTEM, http://askjan.org/cgiwin/typequery.exe?902 (last visited Apr. 7, 2016) (for a list of Vocational
Rehabilitation Agencies).
' The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination
against people with disabilities in employment, transportation, public
accommodation, communications, and governmental activities. The ADA also
establishes requirements for telecommunications relay services.
DOL’s Office of Disability Employment Policy (ODEP) provides publications
and other technical assistance on the basic requirements of the ADA. It does not
enforce any part of the law.
In addition to the Department of Labor, four federal agencies enforce the
ADA:
•The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
enforces regulations covering employment.
•The Department of Transportation enforces regulations
governing transit.
•The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) enforces
regulations covering telecommunication services.
•The Department of Justice enforces regulations governing
public accommodations and state and local government services.
Another federal agency, the Architectural and Transportation Barriers
Compliance Board (ATBCB), also known as the Access Board, issues guidelines to
ensure that buildings, facilities, and transit vehicles are accessible and usable by
people with disabilities.
Two agencies within the Department of Labor enforce portions of the ADA.
•The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP)
has coordinating authority under the employment-related provisions
of the ADA.
•The Civil Rights Center is responsible for enforcing Title II of
the ADA as it applies to the labor- and workforce-related practices of
state and local governments and other public entities. See the Laws &
Regulations subtopic for specific information on these provisions.
Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 153.
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Network (JAN) through the Office of Disability Employment
Policy.220
P.In 2014, DOL provided funding for the following:221
1.The “Add Us In” initiative received a total of $2,774,116.222
Each of the recipients led a consortium working to identify and
develop strategies to increase the capacity of small businesses,
including those in underrepresented and historically excluded
communities, to employ youth and young adults with disabilities.223
2.The West Virginia University Research Corp. in Morgantown,
W.Va., received $2,499,901 to operate the JAN.224 JAN is a free and
confidential consulting service that provides individualized worksite
accommodation solutions and technical assistance spanning the
complete range of disabilities and job functions to ensure compliance
with the Americans with Disabilities Act and other disability-related
legislation.225 It also provides information about self-employment
and small business ownership opportunities for individuals with
disabilities.226
3.The Institute for Educational Leadership in the District of
Columbia received $1,099,984 to operate the National Collaborative


The Job Accommodation Process: Steps to Collaborative Solutions, U.S.
DEPT. OF LABOR (Feb. 2009), http://www.dol.gov/odep/pubs/misc/job.htm.
 News Release, U.S. Dept. of Labor, $8.4M in Continued Funding to
Improve Employment Opportunities for People with Disabilities Announced by
U.S.
Labor
Dept.
(Sept.
11,
2014),
,
http://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/odep/odep20141699 [hereinafter News
Release U.S. Dept. of Labor]
Id.
! The eight recipients who are participating in this initiative are: 1) the
National Organization on Disability in New York; 2) The WorkPlace Inc. in
Bridgeport, Connecticut; 3) the TransCen Inc. in Rockville, Maryland; 4) the
University of Illinois at Chicago in Chicago; 5) the University of Missouri —
Kansas City in Kansas City, Missouri; 6) The University of Oklahoma in Norman,
Oklahoma; 7) the Integrated Recovery Network in Los Angeles and 8) the World
Institute on Disability in Berkeley, California.
" News Release U.S. Dept. of Labor, supra note 222.
# News Release, U.S. Dept. of Labor, U.S. Dept. of Labor Announces $2.5
million Grant Opportunity to Manage, Operate Job Accommodation Network (Jul.
19, 2012), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/odep/ODEP20121220.htm.
$ Id.
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on Workforce and Disability for Youth.227 These funds will be used
to continue the center's work building capacity within and across
youth service delivery systems to improve employment and
postsecondary education outcomes for youth with disabilities.228 The
center will have three areas of focus going forward: 1) career
exploration, management and planning; 2) youth development and
leadership; and 3) professional development.229
4.The National Disability Institute in the District of Columbia
received $1,098,573 to operate the National Center on Leadership for
Employment and Advancement of Citizens with Disabilities
(LEAD).230 These funds support the LEAD Center's ongoing efforts
to conduct policy and research initiatives focused on improving
employment outcomes and economic advancement for individuals
with disabilities.231 Additionally, these resources enable the LEAD
Center to continue developing policies and guidance on best practices
in retention and return-to work, customizing employment, and
conducting policy analysis to ensure that American Job Centers
nationwide are able to effectively serve job seekers with
disabilities.232
5.The Rehabilitation Engineering and Assistive Technology
Society of North America in Arlington, Virginia, received $950,000
to operate ODEP's Partnership on Employment and Accessible
Technology (PEAT). PEAT is a multifaceted initiative working to
advance the employment, retention and career advancement of
people with disabilities through the development, adoption and
promotion of accessible technology.233
Q.Whereas SSA currently merely evaluates claimants for
eligibility for DI or SSI, once VR eligibility (not necessarily DI
eligibility) is established, the contracting VR agency supposedly
develops a written plan establishing the individual's employment goal
and the specific services to be provided to assist the individual to

%

News Release U.S. Dept. of Labor, supra note 222.
Id.
' Id.
! Id.
! Id.
! Id.
!! News Release U.S. Dept. of Labor, supra note 222
&
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reach that goal.234 An individualized plan for employment (IPE) must
be established.235 This plan, developed by the claimant with
assistance from the VR counselor, is reduced to writing.236 The
assessment evaluates the unique strengths, resources, priorities,
abilities and interests of the individual.237 The assessment can cover
educational, psychological, psychiatric, vocational, personal, social
and medical factors that affect the employment and rehabilitation
needs of the individual.238 It may also include a referral for the
provision of rehabilitation technology services, "to assess and
develop the capacities of the individual to perform in a work
environment."239 By law, the IPE is supposed be reviewed at least
annually and amended if there are substantive changes in the
employment outcome, the VR services to be provided, or the service
providers.240 Any changes will not take effect until agreed to by the
individual and the VR counselor.241
R.Each IPE must indicate the expected need for post-employment
services.242 Prior to a decision that an individual has achieved an
employment outcome, there must be a reassessment of the need for
post-employment services.243 If so, they are to be provided under an
!" See Vocational Rehabilitation Services, SOUTH DAKOTA DEPT. OF HUMAN
SERVS., https://dhs.sd.gov/drs/vocrehab/vr.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
235
34 C.F.R. § 361.45 (2016).
!$ 34 C.F.R. § 361.46 (2001).
!% Id.
!& Id.
!' 34 C.F.R. § 361.5 (2016).
" Id.
" Id.
" Ronald M. Hager, Policy and Practice Brief: Order of Selection for
Vocational Rehabilitation Services, CORNELL WORK INCENTIVE SUPPORT CTR.,
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1058&context=e
dicollect (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
"! Post-employment services are defined as services provided after the person
has achieved an employment outcome, which are necessary for the individual "to
maintain, regain or advance in employment." 34 C.F.R. § 361.5(b)(37) A note to
the regulation indicates some possible circumstances in which post-employment
services may be appropriate:
Post-employment services are available to assist an individual to
maintain employment, e.g., the individual's employment is jeopardized
because of conflicts with supervisors or co-workers and the individual
needs mental health services and counseling to maintain the employment;
to regain employment, e.g., the individual's job is eliminated through
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amended IPE.244 Therefore, there is no need for a re-determination of
eligibility.245 A note indicates that post-employment services are not
intended to be complex or comprehensive and should be limited in
scope and duration.246 If more comprehensive services are required, a
new rehabilitation effort should be considered.
S.Special “work incentive” rules are supposed to make it possible
for DI recipients to work and still receive monthly payments and
Medicare or Medicaid similar to the Rehabilitation Act and WIOA.247
Section 505(a) of the Social Security Disability Amendments of
1980, Pub. L. 96-265, directed the Commissioner to develop and
conduct experiments and demonstration projects designed to provide
more cost-effective ways of encouraging disabled beneficiaries to
return to work and leave benefit rolls.248 These experiments and
demonstration projects were supposed to test the advantages and
disadvantages of altering certain limitations and conditions that apply
to title II disabled beneficiaries.249
T.In these “experimental” programs, the Commissioner may
waive compliance with the entitlement and payment requirements for
disabled beneficiaries to carry out experiments and demonstration
projects in the title II disability program.250
U.The GAO has repeatedly determined that SSA had failed to
develop and conduct experiments and demonstration projects in
accordance with the regulations.251

reorganization and new placement services are needed; and to advance in
employment, e.g., the employment is no longer consistent with the
individual's strengths, resources, priorities, concerns, abilities, capabilities,
and interests.
"" Id.
"# See Id.
"$ State Vocational Rehabilitation Agencies and Their Obligation to Maximize
Employment,
NEIGHBORHOOD
LEGAL
SERVS.
INC.,
(1999),
http://nls.org/Disability/VocationalRehabilitation/StateVocationalRehabilitationAg
enciesMaximizeEmployment [hereinafter NEIGHBORHOOD LEGAL SERVS. INC.].
"% 20 C.F.R. § 404.1599.
"& Id.
"' Id.
# Id.
# See Full Medical Continuing Disability Reviews, A-07-09-29147, OFFICE
INSPECTOR
GEN.,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.,
(Mar.
2010)
OF
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/html/A-07-09-29147_7.html
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V.At present, SSA has two demonstration projects: Benefit Offset
National Demonstration (BOND) and Youth Transition
Demonstration (YTD).252
1.BOND tests a $1 reduction in benefits for every $2 in earnings
over substantial gainful activity (SGA) levels, in combination with
benefits counseling, with the goal of helping beneficiaries with
disabilities return-to-work.253 The demonstration allows beneficiaries
to face this gradual reduction in their benefits, eliminating the abrupt
loss of cash benefits. BOND was initiated in January, 2011 and full
implementation began in late April. 2011. A final report is due in
2017.254
2.YTD focuses on youths ages 14-25 who receive Supplemental
Security Income, SSDI, or childhood disability benefits, or who are
at heightened risk of becoming eligible for such benefits.255 YTD
sites develop service delivery systems and partnerships with federal,
state, and local entities to assist youth with disabilities to successfully
transition from school, which may include post-secondary education,
to employment and economic self-sufficiency.256 All six of the
random assignment sites have completed YTD services.257
W.“Subsidies" and "Special Conditions" refer to support on the
job that could result in receipt of more pay than the actual value of
the services performed.258 The value of subsidies and special
conditions are deducted from earnings when SSA determines whether
the work is at the SGA level.259 Following are examples of subsidies
and special conditions:
1. The recipient receives more supervision than other workers
doing a similar job for the same pay.260
#

SSA 2015 Red Book, supra note 164.
Id.
#" Id.
## See SSA 2015 Red Book, supra note 164.
#$ Id.
#%
See Youth Transition Demonstration, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
www.socialsecurity.gov/disabilityresearch/youth.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2016)
(showing the 12-month and 24-month impact reports, as well as the final report, for
all of the sites).
#&
Subsidy
&
Special
Conditions,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/disabilityresearch/wi/subsidies.htm (last visited Apr.
7, 2016).
#' Id.
$ See SSA 2015 Red Book, supra note 164.
#!
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2. The recipient has fewer or simpler tasks to complete than other
workers who are doing the same job for the same pay.261
3. The recipient has a job coach or mentor who helps perform
some of the work.262
X.All job applicants and employers are eligible for employment
services funded through Wagner-Peyser allotments.263 Funding
comes from the DOL Budget and the program is administered by the
DOL Employment and Training Administration.264 Unemployment
Insurance (UI) claimants are the largest customer component and
have an opportunity to receive work skills assessments, counseling,
and job and training referrals.265 Veterans and eligible spouses
receive priority referral to jobs and training, as well as special
employment services and assistance coordinated with the Veterans
Administration.266 Special programs are also available that offer extra
assistance to people who have the hardest time finding employment,
such as the long-term unemployed, individuals with disabilities, at$

Id.
Id.
$! Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933, as amended by the Workforce Investment Act
of 1998, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMIN.,
http://www.doleta.gov/programs/w-pact_amended98.cfm (last visited Apr. 7,
2016). As stated above, the program is administered through the WIA and the
WOIA.
$"See Id. The statute states in part:
b) It shall be the duty of the Secretary [of DOL, not SSA] to assure
that unemployment insurance and employment service offices in each
State, as appropriate, upon request of a public agency administering or
supervising the administration of a State plan approved under part A of
title IV of the Social Security Act, …
(c) The Secretary shall-(1) assist in the coordination and development of a
nationwide system of public labor exchange services, provided as
part of the one-stop customer service systems of the States;
(2) assist in the development of continuous improvement
models for such nationwide system that ensure private sector
satisfaction with the system and meet the demands of jobseekers
relating to the system; and
(3) ensure, for individuals otherwise eligible to receive
unemployment compensation, the provision of reemployment
services and other activities in which the individuals are required
to participate to receive the compensation.
$# Id.
$$ Id.
$
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risk youth, parents receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy
Family support, and dislocated workers:267
1.Claimants for employment are supposed to receive individual
treatment. Data elements are collected from claimants during the
initial claims and/or work registration process and entered into a
computer database that will be used to profile claimants. Necessary
labor market information data would also be entered.268
2.Claimants who have been issued a first unemployment payment
are then profiled using a two-step approach. First, claimants who are
on recall or who use a union hiring hall are excluded. Then, the
remaining claimants are either identified or assigned a probability of
dislocation through a statistical model process or additional
characteristic screens.269
3. A list of claimants who are potentially eligible for referral to
Service Providers is then created by the State's computer system. If a
statistical model is used, claimants are ranked, highest to lowest, in
order of their probability of exhaustion of benefits. If characteristic
screens are used, the result is simply a list of claimants considered
likely to exhaust benefits.270
4.The UI component and Service Provider jointly determine the
number of profiled UI claimants to be selected and referred. This
referral agreement establishes the number of claimants that can be
referred and provided with reemployment services.271
5.In order to create incentives to hire DI recipients and other
priority claimants, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC), a
federal tax credit, is available to employers hiring individuals from
certain target groups who have consistently faced significant barriers
to employment. The maximum tax credit ranges from $1,200 to
$9,600, depending on the employee hired.272

$%

Id.
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR
EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMIN., https://www.doleta.gov/programs/wprs.cfm
(last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
$' Id.
% Id.
% Id.
% Work Opportunity Tax Credit, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR EMPLOYMENT AND
TRAINING ADMIN., http://www.doleta.gov/business/incentives/opptax (last visited
Apr. 7, 2016).
$&
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Y.Extrapolating the statistics, assuming that VR would be applied
at time of application, reduced to present value, for the work life
expectancy of an average successful beneficiary, the return on
investment is probably more than $100 for each VR dollar spent and
"takers" become "makers." Most recipients of VR will not draw from
the fund, and will eventually pay into it. The recipients will also pay
income taxes and increase personal consumption, allowing the
process to ripple into other revenue streams.
Z.VR agencies are considered the payer of last resort for many
services. They will not pay for a service if a similar benefit is
available through some other agency or program.273 If another agency
refuses to provide a service that is within its area of responsibility,
the claimant should not have to wait until that dispute is resolved
before obtaining the service. In the above example, the IPE would list
an item or service to be to be provided and indicate that it would be
provided by SSA as a comparable benefit. If Medicaid then refused
to provide it, the VR agency would be responsible for obtaining the
device, pending resolution with SSA. This can easily be established
as a contract item between SSA, the VR provider and the medical
supplier.
AA.Partial disability. DI is an “all or nothing” concept. From the
beginning of DI, Congress has discussed “partial” disability.
1.A worker can choose to retire as early as age 62, but doing so
may result in a benefit reduction of as much as 30 percent.274 Many
recipients receive a discounted retirement benefit at age 62, and at the
time of application simultaneously file a DI application. If the 62-65
year old claimant is approved for DI, the benefit amount for DI is
awarded as if “full” retirement age, currently age 66, has been met.
For a 62 year old, that amount is usually about 20% higher than the
amount based on date of actual retirement.275
a.One reason for the claim is, of course, the higher payment
amount.

%!

See NEIGHBORHOOD LEGAL SERVS. INC., supra note 247.
The benefit is reduced 5/9 of one percent for each month before normal
retirement age, up to 36 months. If the number of months exceeds 36, then the
benefit is further reduced 5/12 of one percent per month. See Early or Late
Retirement?,
SOC.
SEC.
ONLINE
(2008),
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/quickcalc/early_late.html.
%# Id.
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b.Another reason may or may not be that as a DI recipient, the
claimant will be eligible for Medicare (usually after 25 months from
date of onset).276
c.These claims, which many are questionable and difficult to
adjudicate, clog the system.
d.New developments such as Obamacare could reduce the
number of claimants who are uninsured between ages 62-65, many of
whom are in high risk insurance underwriter categories.
e.Congress could easily prorate the amounts from age 62 to full
retirement date.
In its 2012 Policy Report, CBO estimated great savings by
preventing workers from applying for DI benefits after their 62nd
birthday or from receiving awards if the date they become eligible for
benefits after that birthday.277
I find that this would be extremely harsh for those who become
disabled at that age.
SSA could establish an election whereby at ages 62-65 a claimant
would elect either early retirement or DI at the prorated amount at
retirement, but not both. Of course, this would not be applied
retroactively. Because legislation and rulemaking is necessary, it will
take many years to impact the DI Trust Fund. 
2.CATO proposes a program that would combine benefit offsets
with variable wage subsidies.278 Under a “generalized benefit offset”
(GBO), beneficiaries would choose when and how much to work
according to their health conditions, labor market opportunities, and
work abilities.279
a.If a beneficiary has sufficiently high earnings in any period, he
or she would receive a smaller benefit out of DI’s trust fund but
would also receive a wage subsidy (from a different federal funding

%$ If the eligibility for Medicare were lowered to age 62 from the current 65, I
suspect that DI claims would drop precipitously.
%% CBO estimated that this would affect about 500,000 people in 2022 and
would reduce DI outlays by
about $12 billion in 2022 and by about 6 percent in 2037. However, most of
those budgetary savings would
be offset by larger outlays for retirement benefits.
%& Jagadeesh Gokhale, SSDI Reform: Promoting Gainful Employment while
Preserving Economic Security, 762 POLICY ANALYSIS, CATO INSTITUTE (October
22, 2014), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa762_1.pdf
%'Id.
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source) that increases with earnings up to a certain level well beyond
SGA.280 Over that range, the earnings subsidy would increase the
beneficiary’s income faster than the increase in earnings. Such a
subsidy would provide a more robust work incentive. That payment
structure should induce labor force reentry by beneficiaries who
retain work abilities. However, it is likely to be effective only if SSDI
benefits are restored when earnings decline, for whatever reason.
Essentially, GBO would provide a flexible, prowork system of
payments to those on SSDI.281
b.CATO argues that a key advantage of GBO’s benefit structure
is that it would incentivize recipients who can work to “self-select”
into working rather than remaining out of the labor force, thereby
inducing voluntary labor market choices that would better reveal
beneficiaries’ work capabilities and are better suited to their
economic preferences and opportunities.282
c.From the literature, this suggestion is similar to using ADA
principles in evaluation of claims and using the same methods
currently employed by the Department of Labor Employment and
Training Administration in evaluating and placing disabled
applicants. The mechanism required by the CATO proposal to adjust
benefit amounts based on income and other factors is employed at
SSA in part when calculating SSI benefits. SSI recipients live “in a
fishbowl” because they have a continuing duty to provide financial
data as SSA calculates and recalculates benefit amounts based on the
amounts of income and resources available to the recipient.283 This
creates millions of cases of underpayment and overpayment that may
or may not be appealed through the same system used to adjudicate
DI.
d.If the CATO system were applied, recipients would need to
produce financial record and employers would have to continually
report. From my perspective, the current SSI system is de-

&

Id.
Id.
& Id.
&! Richard Balkus, James Sears, Susan Wilschke, & Bernard Wixon,
Simplifying the Supplemental Security Income Program: Options for Eliminating
the Counting of In-kind Support and Maintenance, 68, SOC. SEC. BULLETIN 15
(2008), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v22n1/v22n1p15.pdf.
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humanizing, because of the inference that recipients need constant
monitoring and supervision.284
e.From the literature, CATO has not scored the proposal.285
f.Because of the need to adjust amounts of benefits and wage
subsidies, given an added expense of SSA labor and without showing
it is cost productive, it is difficult to see how this would benefit the
Trust Fund. The proposal is also limited to recipients, those already
adjudicated as disabled.
a.Also, this is analogous to a workers’ compensation concept
known in most states and under some Federal Statutes as “wage
loss,” used to evaluate “permanent partial” disability (PPD).286
Although there are many variations on the theme under state law,
when a claimant has a compensable injury and has reached maximum
medical improvement,287 an evaluation is made on how to return
claimant to work. If the amount of future wages is the same as former
work, there is no additional payment. However, when there is a
differential, workers’ compensation coverage pays the difference.288
Application of an individualized system would better serve
claimants than the current system. Please note that I differentiate
among claimants and recipients or beneficiaries. I think that if the
ADA/IPE evaluation were performed for appropriate DI applicants
(mostly age 50 and younger), more valid claims would be paid at an
early stage, relieving more claimants of high anxiety and financial
stress.

&"

It is interesting that CATO proposes increased government intrusion. All
DI recipients are recovering FICA taxes, are currently and fully insured, and
arguably are merely collecting under a policy similar to LTD policies.
&# Gokhale, supra note 280.
&$ Id.
&% Maximum medical improvement (MMI) occurs when an injured employee
reaches a state where his or her condition cannot be improved any further or when
a treatment plateau in a person's healing process is reached.
&& See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.§ 908(c). (This section also addresses “scheduled
injuries,” payments for loss of use of certain parts of the anatomy. At the state
level, there is no majority rule, as they vary. In some states, there is a cap in terms
of months of payment. In others, once a claimant is entitled to WC they are also
entitled to SSA retirement benefits. See also PPD Benefits by State, MICH. STATE
UNIV.
(2008),
http://hrlr.msu.edu/hr_executive_education/documents/State20PPD20Laws200802.pdf (providing a summary of state laws).

196

$!# #""#"#!#% & $"

,-'*

If the same process were applied to the CDR process, it is
reasonable that it would increase the 27% denial rate.289
The IPE would more accurately define the medical (i.e. RFC) and
vocational profiles, so once cases are appealed a superior record
would be developed. Under current practice only a few claimants are
receiving the VR services that many more are entitled to receive.
Development by SSA of the IPE/VR evaluation at the application
stage has the potential, standing alone, to completely resolve the DI
Trust Fund dilemma. However, extensive rulemaking is needed to
restructure the existing system and it is expected that it will take
several years to yield results.
BB.Experience Rating. Experience rating is a process for
determining insurance premiums based on the cost of an insurance
pool’s past claims.290 An insurer calculates a firm’s insurance
premium based on the likelihood, or risk, of the firm submitting a
future claim, given its previous behavior.291 Many types of employer&'

Id.
David C. Stapleton, Bending the Employment, Income, and Cost Curves for
People with Disabilities 2 MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., No. 11- 01,
(2011).
' See Id. at 38-40. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.§ 908(c) This section also addresses
“scheduled injuries,” payments for loss of use of certain parts of the anatomy. At
the state level, there is no majority rule, as they vary. In some states, there is a cap
in terms of months of payment. In others, once a claimant is entitled to WC they
are also entitled to SSA retirement benefits. See also PPD Benefits by State, supra
note 290. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) identifies the
following principles of risk management. Risk management should:
•create value – resources expended to mitigate risk should be less
than the consequence of inaction, or (as in value engineering), the gain
should exceed the pain;
•be an integral part of organizational processes;
•be part of decision making process;
•explicitly address uncertainty and assumptions;
•be systematic and structured process;
•be based on the best available information;
•be tailorable;
•take human factors into account;
•be transparent and inclusive;
•be dynamic, iterative and responsive to change;
•be capable of continual improvement and enhancement; and
•be continually or periodically re-assessed.
Committee
Draft
of
ISO
31000
Risk
Management,
http://www.nsai.ie/uploads/file/N047_Committee_Draft_of_ISO_31000.pdf
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sponsored insurance use experience ratings to determine premiums,
including state workers’ compensation (“WC”), unemployment
insurance (“UI”), and private long-term disability insurance
(“LTD”).292
1.Mr. Stapleton and researchers Richard V. Burkhauser, Mary C.
Daly, and Philip R. de Jong address whether it is feasible to treat DI
in the same manner as insurance companies rate employers in
underwriting. 293 Mr. Morton does a thorough job of highlighting
arguments for and against this proposal, and much of the discussion
infra, comes from his paper.294
2.Employers pay the same payroll tax rate on their employees’
earnings for DI, regardless of the rate at which their employees enroll
in the program.295 According to the researchers, especially Mr.
Stapleton, under the current system, employers have little incentive
to make robust investments in preventative, accommodative, or
rehabilitative services, because employees with disabilities can
transition to DI without any additional cost to the employer.296
However, under an experience rated system, employers whose
employees enroll in DI at rates above the national average would pay
a higher payroll tax rate, whereas firms whose employees enter the
program at below average rates would pay a lower payroll tax rate.297
3.According to the researchers and Mr. Morton, in theory, the
experienced-rated payroll tax should incentivize employers to
provide supported-work services, in order to reduce their employees’
enrollment rate in SSDI and subsequently lower their labor costs.298

'

Stapleton, supra note 292.
Id. Insurance premium determination systems and methodologies vary by
state. Workers’ compensation provides medical benefits and a partial wage
replacement to insured workers whose impairment or condition stems from their
employment. Unemployment insurance provides a partial wage replacement to
insured workers who become involuntarily unemployed. See also Richard V.
Burkhauser, Mary C. Daly & Philip R. de Jong, Curing the Dutch Disease: Lessons
for United States Disability Policy (Univ. of Mich. Retirement Research Ctr.,
Working
Paper
2008188,
2008),
http://www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/publications/Papers/pdf/wp188.pdf.
'" Morton, supra note 9.
'# Burkhauser, surpa note 295.
'$ Stapleton, supra note 292.
'% Id.
'& Id.
'!
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4.Mr. Stapleton states that another potential advantage of the
experience rating option is its relative simplicity.299 Employers
already report payroll tax data to the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”), which the agency shares with SSA. Moreover, most
employers are accustomed to the concept of experience rating
stemming from their experience paying state WC and UI
premiums.300 By compiling both payroll tax and beneficiary award
data, SSA could conceivably initiate an experience rating system to
the DI payroll tax “without imposing substantial new reporting
requirements or administrative burdens on employers.”301
5.The researchers admit that notwithstanding the potential for
reduced enrollment in DI, implementing an experience rating system
to the employer’s portion of the payroll tax may adversely affect
some workers.302 For example, experience-rated payroll taxes could
make employers hesitant to hire or retain workers ‘perceived to be a[]
high risk for disability.’303 Employers may discriminate against older
workers, people with chronic conditions such as diabetes, or
individuals prone to at-risk behaviors (e.g., alcohol or substance
abuse) in order to avoid paying a higher payroll tax rate on their
employees’ earnings.304 To address this possibility, supporters of
experience rating suggest implementing risk adjustments specific to
factors such as age, occupation, and health status, as well as
enforcing existing anti-discrimination laws.305
6.In addition, experience rating could conceivably reduce the
compensation or employment opportunities of low-wage workers.
Some employers, subject to higher payroll tax rates, could shift the
additional cost onto workers in the form of reduced take-home pay
and benefits.
7.Alternatively, employers, unable to shift additional labor costs
onto their employees, may instead offset the higher payroll tax rate
''

Id.
Id.
! David H. Autor, The Unsustainable Rise of the Disability Rolls in the
United States: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Options 15 (Nat’l Bureau of
Economic
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
17697,
2011),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17697.
! Stapleton, supra note 292, at 3.
!! Morton, supra note 9, at 40.
!" Id.
!# Id.
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by hiring fewer workers in the future. Mr. Morton aptly notes that
employers may be unable to shift increased labor costs onto
employees due to a lower bound restraint such as the minimum
wage.306 Since many low-wage individuals typically work in
professions with high rates of disability, they may be
disproportionately affected by employer cost avoidance and therefore
more likely to suffer financially as a result.307 Mr. Stapleton would
offset the reduced compensation with an expansion of the Earned
Income Tax Credit (“EITC”) in order to bolster the after-tax income
of low-wage workers.308
8.Opponents of experience rating argue that workers adversely
affected by employer cost avoidance could turn to []DI as a last
resort, thereby increasing worker enrollment. . . .309
9.Some critics of experience rating have expressed concern that
while the system changes the incentives of employers with respect to
program enrollment, it fails to address the incentives of workers to
apply for DI.310 Some workers may apply for DI because of
economic circumstances such as unemployment or low wages.311 The
CBO notes that “[a]lthough the initial determination process screens
out most non-meritorious claimants, SSA may grant awards to some
claimants on the margin of program entry who could potentially work
but choose not to due to economic circumstances.”312 Under an
experience rating system, the former employers of these new
beneficiaries could have their payroll tax rate increased, even though
the beneficiaries based their decision to apply for DI primarily on
factors unrelated to health status or disability. As a result, these
employers would be penalized twice for terminating a worker, insofar
as their UI rate would increase, as well as their payroll tax rate for DI
and Medicare. Given this scenario, opponents contend that
experience rating the employer’s portion of the payroll tax does little
!$

Id.
Id.
!& Stapleton, supra note 292.
!' Morton, supra note 9, at 40.
! Id.
! Id. at 40-41. Moral hazard refers to the tendency for individuals to engage
in risky behavior when they are not fully exposed to the consequences of their
actions.
! Id. at 40.
!%
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to address the moral hazard of workers applying to the program for
reasons unrelated to health status or disability.313
As described, there is no basis to actually determine whether the
Trust Funds would be affected by experience rating employers. It
probably will cost time, effort and expensive start-up funding to
initiate. I also find that the “cons” expressed by the CBO, whether
predominant or not, make the proposal risky.314
Moreover, I find that risk management and experience rating is
not “science.” I note the analogies to WC and LTD. I address LTD in
more detail later, but the history of WC includes a litany of failure
and all fifty states and the District of Columbia are served by
guaranty funds to cover bankrupt WC insurers.315 For example, the
Florida Workers' Compensation Insurance Guaranty Association, Inc.
(FWCIGA) provides a mechanism for the payment of covered
claims, in the event of the insolvency of a member insurer.316 Dozens
of carriers have become bankrupt. In fact the Florida Workers’
Compensation Find, itself became insolvent in 1999.317 Whether
these failures were actually due to improvident underwriting or
whether fraud or indolence was involved, Workers compensation is a
bad analogy.318
In most states, employers are required to provide WC insurance
coverage for their employees or post a bond.319 Some employers have
to be sued for failure to obtain coverage. Although it is not a valid
defense, many are unable to bear the increased costs, including the
administrative expense and time involved.
This proposal would add another layer of bureaucracy. As many
potential DI claimants are self-insured, the proposal does not include
them. Even if a person who is self-insured may have a geographical
or demographic advantage based on risk assessment factors, there is
no way (or reason) to adjust for experience rating.320
!!

Id. at 38.
Publ’n No. 4207, supra note 5.
!# See FLORIDA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION INS. GUARANTY ASSOC.,
http://fwciga.org/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
!$ Id.
!% Id.
!& Id.
!' Id.
! 
For example, someone living in Greenwich Connecticut has a better
geographic risk factor than someone living in Appalachia. According to recent
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Given that legislation and rulemaking is required for this
proposal, and given the controversy, to any degree of probability, it
cannot be effectuated.
IV.RECOMMENDATION 4: ADDRESS ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA.
A.“Severe”
At step 2 of the sequential evaluation in an initial claim, a
claimant must show a “medically determinable impairment” to be
evaluated at the remaining steps.321 At present, almost any bald
allegation of disability constitutes a “severe” impairment at step 2 of
the sequential evaluation. This starts a costly and time consuming
process that may include sending the claimant to a medical expert
(ME) for a consultative examination (CE) and having that report
examined by another ME.322 Even if the allegation of a severe
impairment cannot be substantiated at the DDS level, the case may
enter the appeals process where hundreds of hours of work may be
entailed.
In Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987), the Supreme Court
found that if a claimant is unable to prove a medically severe
impairment, then the claimant is not eligible for disability benefits.323
At Step Two of the sequential evaluation, as the claimant is “not
disabled,” there is no reason to spend taxpayer and DI Fund money

statistics, claimants in certain counties in Appalachia and in the Delta regions of
Mississippi, Arkansas and Louisiana have about 100 times higher incidences of
disability. See Allen Flippen, Where Are the Hardest Places to Live in the U.S.?
NEW YORK TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/26/upshot/where-are-thehardest-places-to-live-in-theus.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Aw%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22
RI%3A11%22%7D&_r=0&abt=0002&abg=1 (last visited June 26, 2014), Please
note that the incidence is ten times greater in Appalachia than in Oklahoma City or
Philadelphia. The 10 lowest counties in the country, by this ranking, include a
cluster of six in the Appalachian Mountains of eastern Kentucky (Breathitt, Clay,
Jackson, Lee, Leslie and Magoffin), along with four others in various parts of the
rural South: Humphreys County, Miss.; East Carroll Parish, La.; Jefferson County,
Ga.; and Lee County, Ark. Moreover life expectancies in most of Appalachia are
ten years less than in most of the rest of the U.S.
!  See Johns, supra note 161.
! Id.
! ! Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 180 (1987).
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for a consultative evaluation or consider the claimant's vocational
factors.324 The burden of proof is supposed to be on the claimant.325
A claimant must produce medical evidence that shows that an
inability to perform basic work activities, as required in most jobs.
i.e. impediments to walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing,
pulling, reaching, carrying or handling; seeing, hearing, and
speaking; understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple
instructions; use of judgment, responding appropriately to
supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; and dealing with
changes in a routine work setting.326 If medical evidence does not
support allegations about the medical profile, the file should be
closed.327
It should be easy to profile which claims will fail to meet the
“severe” standard. Statistics show that over eighty percent of
genitourinary and neoplastic impairments prevail at the initial stage,
while the rate drops to 26.3 percent for skin disorders and to about
thirty percent for musculoskeletal diagnoses.328 Therefore, the range
of variation in initial allowances among the body systems is roughly
fifty-five percentage points.329 In general, the genitourinary and
neoplastic body systems have the highest initial award rates, more
than any other group by at least 20 percentage points.330 As a result,
those two groups also have the lowest proportions of initial denials
not appealed, final allowances, and final denials.331 Applicants with
injuries and skin impairments appear most likely not to appeal an
initial denial, with about thirty-one percent of the outcomes.332
Musculoskeletal diagnoses have the highest proportion of final
! "

Id. See also SSR 88-3c and SSR 85-28.
5 U.S.C. § 556(d). The drafters of the APA used the term “burden of
proof” to mean the burden of persuasion. Director, OWCP, Department of Labor
v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994).
! $ See 20 C.F.R. 404.1569(a), Exertional and nonexertional limitations. See
also SSR 96-8p, Titles II and XVI: Assessing Residual Functional Capacity in
Initial Claims.
! % Appendix C: Components of the Definition Trailer, DICTIONARY OF
OCCUPATIONAL TITLES (2010), http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/INSD/081621.pdf.
! #
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allowances, with about 34 percent of the outcomes, followed by skin
disorders.333 In addition to injuries, however, musculoskeletal and
skin impairments also exhibit the highest rates of final denials.334
In internal SSA rulings and instructions to staff, if the evidence
“is not clearly established” by medical evidence, adjudication must
continue through the sequential evaluation process.335
I argue that as practiced by the agency, the severity standard is
too relaxed. If a claimant is able to work the full range of heavy
work, this generally is sufficient for a finding of “not disabled.”336 As
a matter of convenience at step two at the initial level, almost every
claim is reviewed for matters that are irrelevant at that level, and can
be appealed to the hearings level, and under the current law has to be
heard.337 This is a waste of energy and resources. In FY2011, the unit
cost of adjudicating a disability hearing was $2,752.00, whereas the
unit cost of processing an initial disability claim was $1,058.44.338
The burden of proof is supposed to be on the claimant, and if heavy
work can be performed, and there is no non-exertional overlay, it is
reasonable to stop the process at Step Two in the sequential
evaluation and place the obligation of going forward on the
claimant.339
Statistics will show that misapplication of Bowen v. Yuckert
unnecessarily bogs the adjudication system. In some states anyone

!!!

Id. This probably a function of the duration requirement as the conditions
could be “severe” if they were to last 12 consecutive months to meet the durational
aspect.
!!" Appendix C: Components of the Definition Trailer, supra note 329.
!!# Id.
An applicant is denied at step 2 if his or her impairment(s) is considered not
severe. DI 24505.001 Individual Must Have a Medically Determinable Severe
Impairment,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.
(2012),
https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0424505001. Applicants are also denied
if their impairments fail the duration test; that is, if the impairment (1) is not
expected to result in death, and (2) has neither lasted 12 months nor is expected to
last for a continuous period of 12 months. The duration test is typically invoked at
step 2, but may also be invoked at step 3, 4, or 5.
!!$ 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2015).
!!% Id.
!!& Aspects of Disability
Decision Making: Data and Materials, SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD. (Feb. 2012),
http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/1-11-CV-00224.pdf.
!!' 42 USC § 423(d)(1)(A) (2015).
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who receives state benefits, i.e. public assistance or unemployment,
even if not related to disability, must apply to SSA to receive the state
benefits.340 An applicant should be able to prove at least a medically
determinable impairment as a condition precedent to proceed to a
hearing. There is no reason the DDS cannot be provided a clear
indication through a neutral interrogatory from the claimant’s treating
sources soon after the claim is filed.341
At the time of application, claimants should be informed that
their chances of success improve with representation, and that they
may use services under the WIOA and the Wagner-Peyser Act. It
may be that after an IPE is developed a claimant is rejected for VR,
that fact will presume that the claimant is “disabled.”
In the current setting, to promote judicial economy, absent further
legislation or rulemaking, if a case has a questionable medically
determinable impairment, at the hearings level, before unnecessary

!" This is why there are a disproportionate number of claims in states that
force SSI claims and explains why the probability for awards in these states should
be less likely. For states, it is generally financially advantageous for adults and
children with disabilities to transfer from such programs as Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) to SSI. States gain because the federal government
pays for the SSI benefit, and states can then use the TANF savings for other
purposes. The families gain because the SSI benefits they acquire are greater than
the TANF benefits they lose. The payoff to states from transferring welfare
recipients to SSI was substantially increased when Congress replaced AFDC with
TANF in 1996. States retained less than half of any savings achieved through such
transfers under AFDC, but they retain all of the savings under TANF. Also, the
work participation requirements under TANF have obligated states to address the
work support needs of adults with disabilities who remain in TANF, and states can
avoid these costs if adults have disabilities that satisfy SSI eligibility requirements.
The incentive for TANF recipients to apply for SSI has increased over time as
inflation has caused real TANF benefits to fall relative to payments received by SSI
recipients. Steve Wamhoff and Michael Wiseman, The TANF/SSI Connection, U.S.
SOCIAL
SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE
OF
POLICY,
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v66n4/v66n4p21.html. In addition, five states
enacted employer temporary disability insurance (“TDI”) mandates prior to the first
year of data included in this analysis: California (1946), Hawaii (1969), New Jersey
(1948), New York (1949), and Rhode Island (1942). Norma B. Coe et al. supra.
According to Coe, et al, holding all else constant, the five states that mandate
employer TDI should have lower application rates.
!"
SSA can use a “report of contact” with the treating sources through
telephone and even social media within the first 10 days. Claimants should be
given the opportunity to get statements from their treating sources and should be
provided SSA DI forms appropriate to their alleged impairments.
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development work is committed to the claim, an administrative law
judge should be able to issue an order to show cause whether one
exists.
B.Medical Vocational Guidelines
As stated above, the DOT was last updated in 1991.342 Since the
grids are based on them, they are most probably flawed. Bills in both
the House and Senate would require the Commissioner to proscribe
rules and regulations to update the medical-vocational guidelines,
appendix 2 to the Regulations.343 This has been discussed for years.
In July 2012, the DOL Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) contracted
with SSA to test the viability of using the DOL BLS’ National
Compensation Survey (NCS) to collect updated occupational data.344
According to SSA, the agency plans to conduct ongoing testing and
analysis of its data collection process in FY2013 and FY2014, with
the expectation of implementing the new OIS starting in FY2016.345
In November 2005, SSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) that proposed to increase the age categories for older
insured workers by two years.346 However, after receiving adverse
comments, SSA withdrew the NPRM in May, 2009.347
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) examined the effects of
increasing the 45-49 and 50-54 age ranges by two years to 47-51 and
52-56 and making 57 to FRA the new maximum range, thereby
eliminating the 45, 46, and 60 and older categories.348 According to
CBO, implementing this policy option in 2013 would have decreased
the number of SSDI beneficiaries by 50,000 or 0.5% in 2022, as well
as reduced program expenditures by $1.0 billion in that year.349
Adjusting the age categories for vocational factors would likely
encourage older insured workers to seek out other potential income
supports. According to the CBO, whereas workers aged 62 to FRA
!"

See supra note 190.
The GRIDD Act of 2015, S.1194, 114th Cong. (2015-2016).
!""
Occupational Information System Project, SOC. SEC. ADMIN..,
http://www.ssa.gov/disabilityresearch/occupational_info_systems.html.
!"# Id.
!"$ Age as a Factor in Evaluating Disability, 70 Federal Reg. 67104 (2005).
!"% 74 Federal Reg. 21563 (2009).
!"& Publ’n No. 4207, supra note 5. See also Morton, supra, note 9, at 23-24.
!"' Publ’n No. 4207, supra note, at 18.
!"!
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could apply for early retirement benefits, workers with a recent
attachment to the labor force may choose to apply for other workrelated supports such as state workers’ compensation, private
disability insurance, or unemployment insurance.350
Apparently, SSA does not have studies that support a need to
increase the age by two years. Critics note that although the worklife
and life expectancies of all workers are on the rise, those in the lower
income occupations have actually decreased worklife and life
expectancies.351
I argue that the grids should not be applied to younger
individuals. The regulations recognize that age is a positive factor for
claimants who are under age 45 and is usually not a significant factor
in limiting an individual's ability to make a vocational adjustment,
even an adjustment to unskilled sedentary work, and even where the
individual is illiterate or unable to communicate in English.352 A
younger individual who meets “disabled” criteria would have met or
equaled a listed impairment at step 3 of the sequential evaluation,
before application of the grids.353 Some Circuit Courts provide a

!#

Mr. Morton points out that low-income claimants would most likely apply
for SSI and Medicaid in response to the adjustment in the age categories. Morton,
supra note 9, at 24.
!# See E.G., Paul Krugman, Expanding Social Security, NEW YORK TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/opinion/krugman-expanding-socialsecurity.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2013). (“Those with lower incomes and less
education have, at best, seen hardly any rise in life expectancy at age 65; in fact,
those with less education have seen their life expectancy decline.”). See also The
Life
Expectancy
Zombie,
NEW
YORK
TIMES
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/05/the-life-expectancy-zombie/?_r=0
(last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
!# See Appendix 2 to the Regulations.
!#! 20 C.F.R. 404.1545(5). How we will use our residual functional capacity
assessment. (i) We will first use our residual functional capacity assessment at step
four of the sequential evaluation process to decide if you can do your past relevant
work. See §§ 404.1520(f) and 404.1560(b))
(ii) If we find that you cannot do your past relevant work, you do not have any
past relevant work, or if we use the procedures in § 404.1520(h) and § 404.1562
does not apply, we will use the same assessment of your residual functional
capacity at step five of the sequential evaluation process to decide if you can adjust
to any other work that exists in the national economy. See §§ 404.1520(g) and
404.1566. At this step, we will not use our assessment of your residual functional
capacity alone to decide if you are disabled. We will use the guidelines in §§
404.1560 through 404.1569a, and consider our residual functional capacity
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defacto basis for equaling the record.354 Although some believe that a
claimant is “disabled” if (s)he cannot perform a full range of
sedentary work. Actually, if a claimant does not, in fact, have the
residual functional capacity for a full range of sedentary work, the
case must be evaluated within the framework of the vocational
rules.355 “The functional restrictions which limit the claimant to less
than the full range of sedentary work must be specified.356 It must
then be determined whether, considering all of the functional
limitations, a "significant number" of sedentary jobs which the
claimant can perform exists in the national economy.357 Evaluation
using the grids, whether or not as a “framework” for decision
making, is a mere formality for younger individuals.
Moreover, the evaluation should be more individualized.
Although there is no DI equivalent, for example, SSA administers a
Plan to Achieve Self-Support (PASS), which lets a recipient pay for
items or services needed to achieve a specific work goal.358 This is
similar to the WIOA VR process when an equivalent to an IPE is
developed.359 Again, it may be that after an IPE is developed a
claimant is rejected for VR, that fact will force the adjudicator to
presume that the claimant is “disabled.”360
assessment together with the information about your vocational background to
make our disability determination or decision.
!#" See, e.g., Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2004) (observing
that it was improbable that claimant’s physicians would have prescribed drugs and
other treatment for her if they had believed that she was faking her pain and noting
that “[s]uch an inference would amount to an accusation that the medical workers
who treated [the claimant] were behaving unprofessionally”). More recently, in
Goins v. Colvin, 764 F. 3d 677 (7th Cir.2014), he again attacked the decision for
undermining subjective complains of several impairments competent to produce
disability. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Posner opinion takes aim at denial of
disability benefits; is it a 7th Circuit trend?, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 21, 2014),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/posner_opinion_takes_aim_at_denial_of_
disability_benefits_is_it_a_7th_circu.
!## SSR 86-8: Titles II and XVI: The Sequential Evaluation Process, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN.,
https://www.socialsecurity.gov/op_home/rulings/di/01/ssr86-08-di01.html.
!#$ Id.
!#% Id.
!#&
Plan to Achieve Self-Support (PASS), SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/disabilityresearch/wi/pass.htm.
!#' See WIOA Overview, supra, note 218.
!$ Id.
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On the other hand, development of the IPE is more defined that
the current “vocational profile” needed to establish past relevant
work and other job duty evidence at step 5 of the adult listing.361 This
would eliminate the need to use the grid as a framework for decision
making.
At present, at hearing, if a claimant has a non-exertional
impairment, a vocational expert is required in most circuits.
As to those closely approaching advanced age and older, the issue
is usually transferability. Perhaps the ADA should be incorporated
into decision making. If an IPE were developed, educational,
psychological, psychiatric, vocational, personal, social and medical
factors that affect the employment and rehabilitation needs would be
individualized.
C.“Double Dip”
Bills in both the House and Senate would have substantial gainful
activity within a month after an individual is paid, or determined to
be eligible for, unemployment compensation.362
A claimant for unemployment must swear under oath that (s)he is
ready willing and able to work, and work search is required. A
claimant for DI must swear that (s)he is unable to perform any
gainful activities.363 These concepts are conflicted.
D.MIRS
SSA has investigated whether the MIRS standard used in CDRs,
which requires that SSA show medical improvement before benefits
can be terminated, should be retained.364 The IG determined that if
SSA used the Initial Disability Standard, rather than MIRS during a
!$

Id.
Social Security Disability Insurance and Unemployment Benefits Double
Dip Elimination Act, S. 499, 114th Cong. (2015-2016); Social Security Disability
Insurance and Unemployment Benefits Double Dip Elimination Act, H.R. 918,
114th Cong. (2015-2016).
!$! Id.
!$" 20 C.F.R. 404.1594. See Statement of Inspector Gen. O’Carroll Jr., supra
note 112. See also The Medical Improvement Review Standard During Continuing
Disability Reviews, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (May 2014),
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-01-13-23065.pdf.
The
investigation found numerous coding mistakes that also should be resolved. Id.
!$
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CDR, about $269 million less in benefits would be due until the next
CDR due date to about 4,000 adult beneficiaries who would not be
disabled.365
A major problem with this suggestion is that it has been tried
unsuccessfully. At the onset of the Reagan Administration, about one
million beneficiaries were subject to a three-year CDR review, and
between March 1981 and early 1984, federal-funded state Disability
Determination Services agencies terminated the benefits of almost
500,000 disabled Americans, including tens of thousands of
beneficiaries with severe mental impairments. Twenty-nine states
refused to follow SSA’s instructions for termination of benefits;
federal courts were clogged with appeals; 200 federal courts across
the country threatened the government with contempt of court
citations for refusing to pay benefits when ordered.
Litigation challenging the CDR policy was instituted across the
county, including more than 12,000 individual appeals of
terminations and forty class actions. Many courts ordered SSA to
apply a medical improvement standard before terminating disability
benefits and one-half of the states refused to follow SSA’s new
procedures and criteria. By April 1984, the Administration finally
announced a nationwide moratorium on CDRs. Ultimately Congress
enacted the Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 (DBRA) to
clarify eligibility and to limit terminations to cases where the agency
could show that the beneficiary’s medical condition had improved.366
E.Increase of the Currently Insured Requirement
A recency-of-work test is satisfied if the worker has earned at
least twenty credits during a 40-quarter period that ends with the
quarter in which the waiting period begins.367
A special test for younger workers provides an alternative. A
worker who is under a disability which began before the quarter of
attainment of age thirty-one satisfies the “current” requirement if

!$#

Id.
Katharine P. Collins and Anne Erfle, Social Security Disability Benefits
Reform Act of 1984: Legislative History and Summary of Provisions, 48 SOC. SEC.
BULLETIN 4 (1985), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v48n4/v48n4p5.pdf.
!$% Tim Zayatz, Social Security Disability Insurance Program Worker
Experience,
Actuarial
Study
No.
118,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/as118/DI-WrkerExper_Body.html#wp1237389.
!$$
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credits were earned for at least one-half of the quarters during the
period beginning with the quarter after the quarter the worker
attained age twenty-one, and ending with the quarter in which the
disability began.368 If this period contains twelve or fewer quarters—
that is, if the disability begins in the quarter the worker attains age
twenty-four or earlier—then a minimum of six credits must be earned
in the twelve-quarter period ending with the quarter in which the
disability began.369
CBO recently estimated the impact of increasing the recency-ofwork requirement on beneficiary enrollment.370 The agency projected
that requiring disability claimants to have worked four of the past six
years (instead of five of the past ten) starting in 2013 would have
reduced the number of SSDI beneficiaries by 4% in 2022, as well as
decreased program outlays by $8.0 billion in that year.371
According to Mr. Morton, the stricter recency-of-work
requirement would likely affect individuals with intermittent work
histories, specifically workers with prolonged and sustained bouts of
absence from covered employment due to unemployment or
withdrawal from the labor force.372 A recent study found that while
men report leaving the labor force primarily because of disability,
women typically report leaving the labor force to care for someone in
their household.373 Consequently, the morestringent recency-of-work
requirement may disproportionately affect women who drop out of
the labor force to act as caregivers.
I find that any gains to the DI Fund because of a failure to meet
the currently insured requirement will most probably be lost to SSI

!$&

Id.
Id.
!% Options For Reducing the Deficit: 2014-2013, Mandatory Spending,
(2013),
Function
650Social
Security,
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE
https://www.cbo.gov/budget-options/2013/44755.
!% Publ’n No. 4207, supra note 5, at 18; Morton, supra note 9, at 23.
!% Morton, supra note 9.
!%! Julie L. Hotchkiss, M. Melinda Pitts & Fernando Rios-Avila, A Closer
Look at Nonparticipants During and After the Great Recession 6 (Fed. Reserve
Bank,
Working
Paper
2012-10,
2012),
http://www.frbatlanta.org/pubs/wp/12_10.cfm.
!$'
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and the general funds. Moreover, public policy should not
discriminate against caregivers.374
V.RECOMMENDATION FIVE: REDUCE FRAUD
A.In General
Although accusations of widespread fraud are grossly
exaggerated, Congress should eliminate the taint. Recently, the SSA
IG reported that over a ten-year period, SSA overpaid recipients of
about seventeen billion dollars.375 The IG bases this estimate on a
sampling of both DI and SSI claims, so the amount is substantially
less for the DI program.376 SSA recovered about $8.1 billion of the
$16.8 billion in overpayments it assessed and prevented about $8
billion in overpayments.377 Considering in the amounts paid into the
system, the differences are not as large as depicted in the headlines.
Some of the reasons the IG found are:
a.Work activity or income: Cessation if the work activity
constitutes SGA.378
b.Payment issued after death: An individual’s benefits stop with
death.379
c. Imprisonment or fugitive status: The Social Security Act
prohibits the payment of DI to recipients convicted and incarcerated

!%" See Sarah E. Hoffman, Falling Through the Cracks: How the 20/40 Rule
Discriminates Against Women Seeking Social Security Disability Insurance
Benefits and What Congress Can Do About It, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 621, (2009).
!%# Overpayments in the Social Security Administration’s Disability Program –
a Ten Year Study, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Jun.
2015)[hereinafter
Overpayments],
http://oig.ssa.gov/audits-andinvestigations/audit-reports/A-01-14-24114; See also Report: Social Security
Overpaid Disability Benefits by $17B, NEW YORK TIMES (Jun. 5, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/06/05/us/politics/ap-us-social-securityoverpayments.html.
!%$ Id.
!%% Id.
!%& Id.
!%' Id.
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for a period of more than 30 days in a jail, prison, or other penal or
correctional facility; (2) DI benefits to beneficiaries having certain
unsatisfied warrants.380
d. Medical improvement: Through CDR: if the individual is no
longer disabled, he/she may appeal and continue to receive benefits
during the appeal process. If the appeal affirms the disability ceased,
SSA assesses an overpayment for the amount of benefits paid during
the appeal process.381
e. Duplicate benefit payment: Payment issued more than once for
the same month. For example, an individual receiving a replacement
check after reporting not receiving the original check and then
cashing both checks.382
f. Incorrect payment computations: The payment amount was
based on incorrect information.383
g. Improperly entitled to benefits: Under certain circumstances,
SSA may reopen a prior allowance decision and change it to a denial,
such as when a disability beneficiary returns to work and performs
SGA within a few months from the date the disability began.384
h. Not cooperative: SSA may suspend an individual’s payment
for failure to provide the Agency pertinent information.385
i. Married: Entitlement to certain DI benefits (i.e. widow or
widower) depend on the beneficiary being unmarried.386

!&

Id. Social Security Act, §§ 202(x)(1)(A)(i), (iv)-(v) & (B)(iii)-(iv); Social
Security Act1611(e)(1)(A) & 1611(e)(4); 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(x)(1)(A)(i), (iv)-(v) &
(B)(iii)-(iv); 1382(e)(1)(A) & 1382(e)(4). See Social Security Inspector General
Report: Implementation of Phase I of the Martinez Settlement Agreement, OFFICE
OF
THE
INSPECTOR
GEN.
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.
(Feb.
2011),
http://oig.ssa.gov/newsroom/news-releases/social-security-inspector-generalreport-implementation-phase-i-martinez.
!& Overpayments, supra note 379.
!& Id.
!&! Id.
!&" Id.
!&# Id.
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j. Receiving Multiple Benefits: Dual entitlement exists when a
beneficiary is entitled to more than one benefit at the same time. For
example, a beneficiary may be entitled to retirement benefits on his
or her own earnings record and to spouse’s benefits on another
person’s earnings record. Although a beneficiary may be
simultaneously entitled to more than one benefit, the total benefit
may not be greater than the highest single benefit amount to which he
or she is entitled. Generally, SSA calculates the amounts due and
combines the benefits into one monthly payment.387
k. Needed a representative payee: SSA assigns a representative
payee to an individual when the Agency determines the individual is
incapable of handling his/her own benefits. SSA may suspend
payment while establishing or changing a representative payee, and
an overpayment may occur to beneficiaries for the same month.388
Meanwhile, whereas the SSA database includes approximately
6.5 million individuals who would be age 112 or older, other sources
list only 35 people aged 112 or older in the world as of October.
2013.389 Of course, none of these discrepancies has anything to do
with disability fraud, but there is some question whether this is fraud
or error and if it is error it is by the same organization administering
DI.
The IG has performed a valuable service,390 but I find that the
emphasis does not account for many DI recipients who work at SGA
!&$

Id.
Overpayments, supra note 379.
!&& Id.
!&' Sean Williams, Social Security Fraud: The Mind-Numbing Reason the SSA
Is Being Cheated Out of Billions, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Jun.13, 2015),
http://www.fool.com/retirement/general/2015/06/13/social-security-fraud-themind-numbing-reason-the.aspx. (“Per the OIG, some 1.4 million beneficiaries had
death notes input into their records, but an official date of death had not been
recorded, thus signaling, … that these individuals were still alive. Another 410,000
individuals had their payments terminated and death dates added, but the official
death date information was not passed on . . . .”).
!&%

!' Most of these examples are probably not fraud in the criminal sense, but are
errors. Most of the “mistakes” would probably be covered in private industry by
“error and omission” insurance coverage.
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but fail to report. An underground economy is comprised of people
who do not report income to SSA let alone to IRS. Some sources
allege that the “shadow economy” in this country yields as much as
10% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).391 The same sources allege
that the shadow economy doubled from 4 % of GDP in 1970 to 9 %
in 2000.392
Other sources think the “tax gap” is much higher.393 Forensic
economists estimated that 18%- 19 % of income nationwide is not
reported to the IRS.394 “The estimated $2 trillion of unreported
income gives rise to an annual tax gap of $450-500 billion.”395
A “new” underground economy may entail:
…a lot of people doing honest work, such as freelancers and
consultants who used to be full-time professionals, computer-repair
people laid off from corporate IT departments, home remodelers
benefiting from a revived housing sector, people running eBay
business, and retirees earning a few extra bucks by running errands
for busy parents.396

!'
Friedrich
Schneider
&
Dominik
Enste,
FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues30/;\ See also Joshua Zumbrun,
More Americans Work in the Underground Economy, BlOOMBERG NEWS, (Mar.
28, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-03-28/more-americanswork-in-the-underground-economy).
!' Id.
!'! Richard Cebula and Edgar Feige, America’s unreported economy:
measuring the size, growth and determinants of income tax evasion in the U.S., 57
CRIME,
LAW
AND
SOCIAL
CHANGE
265-85
(2012),
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/econ/archive/wp2011-1.pdf.
!'" Id.
!'# Id.
!'$ Rick Newman, The New Underground Economy: More people than ever
may be working off-the-books--and spending freely, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REPORT
(Mar.
18,
2013),
http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/ricknewman/2013/03/18/the-new-underground-economy.According
to
Newman,
economists estimate the size of the underground economy at somewhere between
8%-14% of total GDP, “which could amount to as much as $2 trillion worth of
economic activity. Authorities in California say off-the-books transactions cost the
state $6.5 billion in lost tax revenue every year.” “If the trend is similar throughout
the U.S. economy, that would amount to roughly $50 billion in lost tax revenue for
all 50 states combined, plus an even bigger chunk that Washington fails to collect.”
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If the estimates are correct and FICA taxes were received, and if
all recipients currently working off the books were accountable, there
would be no threat to default of the DI Trust Fund.
Congress has noted that SSA bars adjudicators from researching
whether some claimants have opened themselves for investigation by
postings in social media.397 Most of the complaints come from
administrative law judges, and some have been discussed at
Congressional hearings.398
I take the position that the agency has a duty to perform an
investigation, “scouting,”399 where there is good cause to do so.
When the DO collects medical and vocational information to create a
claim file, it should ask questions about daily activities and social
media is prevalent. If there is probable cause to investigate further,
referrals should be made to the IG. Perhaps the DDS should also
perform this function. However, I also take the position that this
function should be performed by investigators and not administrative
law judges. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) states that
“[a]n employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative
or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a
factually related case, participate or advise in the decision.”400
I also recommend that Congress expand qui tam to permit suits to
collect unpaid FICA taxes (as well as income taxes) and benefit the
SSA Trust Funds against employers who knowingly pay workers
“under the table.” Many unsuspecting workers discover when they
become injured that they have no DI benefits.
These suggestions will not immediately restore the DI Trust Fund
to solvency, but may mitigate significant losses.

!'%
See, e. g., Congress, Serial No. 113-72 (Nov. 19, 2013)
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg86479/html/CHRG113hhrg86479.htm.
!'& Id.
!'' SSA DO employees investigate. At one time SSA early retirement placed
restrictions on working and employees would report after an investigation. The
underlying law has changed and scouting is no longer performed.
" 5 U.S.C. § 554(d). Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat.
237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 500 et. seq.). 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59,
701–06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 6362, 7562.
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B.Bar LTD Carriers from Laying Off Exposure to the DI Trust
Fund
As I have stated, some LTD carriers attempt to offset their
exposure by requiring insureds to apply for DI. In 2009 the New York
Times reported that disability insurers were compelling claimants to
apply for Social Security even when they did not qualify, and were
cutting off insurance checks if the claimants failed to do so.401 In
response to a “qui tam” (whistleblower) lawsuit, Unum, one of the
largest disability insurers, and Cigna stated in court filings that
insurers may send ineligible persons to SSA to file claims, noting the
agency “has an open-door policy.402 All comers are welcome.”403
This bogs the system, and according to the qui tam complaints, leads
to claimants wrongfully losing their LTD.404
The reason claimants are jeopardized is because the LTD
standard in the qui tam cases requires the insured to prove an
inability to work in one’s “own occupation,” not an SSA/DI inability
to perform SGA, which is a far more restrictive test.405 Most DI
claimants who receive LTD are in better financial status than most
other beneficiaries.406 Processing these claims affects claims of
others, mostly without income while waiting for “months and years,
who in many cases are much worse off.” 407After an investigation,
Senator Charles Grassley (R. IA.) wrote a letter to SSA
recommending the following:

" Collette Mattzie, The Disability Mess, THE NEW YORK TIMES (May 2009),
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/07/the-disability-mess/commentpage-4/?_r=0.
" Although a jury returned a verdict against the LTD companies, it was
remanded on appeal by the 1st Circuit Court of Appeals. United States ex rel.
Loughren v. Unum Group, 613 F.3d 300 (1st Cir. 2010).
"! Mattzie, supra note 405.
"" See also Mary Williams Walsh, Insurers Faulted as Overloading Social
NEW
YORK
TIMES,
(April
1,
2008),
Security,
THE
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/01/business/01disabled.html.
"# Press Release, Grassley works to strengthen Social Security disability
program: Senator seeks agency response to backlog caused by insurance
community (May 27, 2009), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/newsreleases/grassley-works-strengthen-social-security-disability-program.
"$ Id.
"% Quoted from Ken Nabali, former SSA Associate Commissioner, Id.
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(1)Require that individuals applying for SSA benefits disclose
whether or not they have private or other non-SSA disability
coverage or benefits at the time they file their SSDI or Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) application;408
(2)Require SSDI and SSI applicants and claimant representatives
to attest to the accuracy and truthfulness of SSDI or SSI claim
information; and409
(3)Implement information sharing arrangements with private
insurers and other non-SSA disability programs to exchange
information regarding the status or disposition of disability claims.410
He also asked the Social Security Administration and the Federal
Trade Commission for status reports on their evaluation of private
insurance practices in this area.411 A diligent search yields no
response.
Mr. Morton notes that as of March 2012, 39% of all workers in
private industry had access to short-term disability insurance,
whereas 33% had access to long-term LTD.412 Short-term private
disability insurance (PDI) typically lasts a fixed number of weeks or
months, whereas LTD insurance can last anywhere from a year to
FRA.413 Compared with other forms of employer-care, PDI is
relatively inexpensive.414 In addition, employers can partially offset
the cost of PDI by requiring employees to contribute to the plan.415
"& Letter from Charles E. Grassley, U.S. Senator for Iowa, to Hon. Michel
Astrue,
Commn’r
Soc.
Sec.
Admin.
(Mar.
24,
2008),
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-works-strengthensocial-security-disability-program.
"' Id.
" Id.
" Id.
" Morton, supra note 9.
"! In March 2012, the median duration of benefit receipt on short-term PDI
for all workers in private industry was Employee Benefits Survey, Short-Term
Disability Plans: Duration of Benefits, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS,
Table
25
(Mar.
2012),
http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2012/ownership/private/table35a.htm.
"" In December 2012, employee health insurance cost employers in private
industry $2.23 per-hour worked, whereas employee short-term disability insurance
cost $0.05 and long-term disability insurance cost $0.04 per-hour worked. See
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Although the future is uncertain, the current trend appears away
from traditional employer-employee relationships to selfemployment and use of independent contractors, and these plans do
not include them.
The insurance industry has advocated that Congress should
promote employer sponsored PDI “to reduce the growth in DI
rolls.”416 Employer-sponsored PDI plans have the potential to reduce
the incidence of DI benefit receipt, inasmuch as they provide
employment support services soon after the onset of disability when
the likelihood of recovery is highest. Proponents argue that by
intervening with robust supported-work services early in the
disability process, PDI and LTD may keep disabled workers attached
to the labor force and therefore less likely to apply for DI.417
Mr. Morton reports that the promotion of employer-sponsored
PDI could come about in either one of two ways: (1) encouragement
through incentives or (2) a government mandate.”418 Under the
former option, the federal government would offer employers
financial incentives to provide PDI for their employees. For example,
if the federal government adopted an experience rating system to the
employer’s portion of the DI and Medicare payroll tax, SSA could
further lower the payroll tax rate of employers who purchase PDI and
LTD and whose insurance agents coordinate with SSA officials
(gatekeepers) to manage disability cases in a cost-effective manner.

Economic News Release, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table 5:
Private Industry, by Major Occupational Group and Bargaining Status (Dec. 2012),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.t05.htm.
"# In March 2012, 19% of short-term PDI plans sponsored by employers in
private industry required employee
contributions, whereas 8% of long-term PDI plans had such a requirement. See
Employee Benefits Survey: Nat’l Compensation Survey, Employee Benefits in the
U.S., U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Tables Organized by
Benefit (Mar. 2012), http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/ 2012/benefits.htm#life.
"$
David H. Autor & Mark Duggan, Supporting Work: A Proposal for
Modernizing the U.S. Disability Insurance System, THE CTR. FOR AMERICAN
PROGRESS
and
THE
HAMILTON
PROJECT
(2012),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/12/disability-insurance-autor
"% See Coe et al., supra note 86. The authors found that state-mandated
temporary disability insurance (TDI) has a small negative effect on overall SDI
applications.
418
Morton, supra note 9.
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Alternatively, the federal government could award subsidies or tax
credits to firms that provide PDI and LTD.420
Under the latter option, the federal government would require all
employers to provide PDI for their employees. To enforce the
mandate, employers who fail to provide PDI would likely face
financial penalties for their non-compliance. In 2010, only New
Jersey, New York, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico required employers to
provide some form of short-term PDI—known as temporary
disability insurance (TDI)—or contribute to a state-operated fund.421
Employer-mandated PDI, however, has become an increasingly
popular approach to finance disability insurance in many European
countries.
Mr. Morton reports that researchers David H. Autor and Mark
Duggan have proposed requiring all employers to provide mediumterm PDI, through which workers with disabilities would receive
rehabilitation services, workplace accommodation, and a partial wage
replacement for two years.422 Plans under this proposal would be
purchased on the existing PDI market, and employers would be
permitted to require employees to contribute up to 40% of the cost of
their coverage.423 Following the exhaustion of employer-sponsored
PDI, SSA would transition beneficiaries who still lack the ability to
engage in SGA onto SSDI.424 Workers with extremely severe or
terminal disabilities would be exempt from the two-year PDI
requirement and would instead be immediately fast-tracked onto
DI.425

"'

Autor, supra note 420 at, 39 n.228 (c).
Id. at 42, n.249 (c).
"  Id. at n.250 (“TDI typically provides partial compensation due to nonoccupational disability for approximately 26 to 52 weeks. For more information,
see Social Security Administration, No. 13-11758, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. 46 (Jul.
1997), http://www.SSA.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/sspus/).
" Id. at n.252 (citing Autor, supra note 420).
" ! Id., n.253 (“rated for firms with 50 or more full-time equivalent employees,
whereas smaller firms would have their premiums determined based on
differentiated rates by industry.”)
" " Morton, supra note 9.
" #Autor,supra note 420, at n.254 “protect employers from the so-called
“double indemnity” of paying higher experienced-rated premiums for both UI and
PDI, unemployed workers would be unable to claim both UI and PDI benefits
simultaneously.”)
" 

220

$!# #""#"#!#% & $"

,-'*

These are interesting proposals, but as with many of the others, it
will take years for Congressional action, regulation, and
implementation, and therefore they are not an immediate resolution
to DI Trust Fund default. Several LTD carries and their lobbyists
have been arguing for privatization of the entire system, and/or
contracting evaluation from DDS to private companies.426
In looking at whether state mandated LTD (or PDI) in New
Jersey, New York, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico have reduced rates for
applications and awards in those states, I find no valid studies to
substantiate the claim that private insurance generates savings. As a
matter of fact, the SSA OIG has identified three of the four as states
where systematic fraud on the DI system has occurred.427
" $

Id at 16.
See, e.g., Damian Paletta, Disability-Fraud Probe Leads to Arrests in
Puerto Rico: Social Security Benefits May Have Been Improperly Obtained, THE
WALL
STREET
JOURNAL
(Aug.21,
2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323665504579026583651700434
;
William K. Rashbaum & Jamed C. McKinley Jr., Charges for 106 in Huge
Fraud Over Disability, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 1, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/08/nyregion/retired-new-york-officers-andfirefighters-charged-in-social-security-scheme.html?hpw&rref=nyregion&_r=1.
Scores of former police officers and firefighters were arrested on
Tuesday and brought in handcuffs to State Supreme Court in
Manhattan, where they were arraigned before Acting Justice
Daniel Fitzgerald on charges of grand larceny. They are accused
of collecting between $30,000 and $50,000 a year.
Many of the 72 city police officers and eight firefighters named
in the 205-count indictment had blamed the Sept. 11 attacks for
what they described as mental problems: post-traumatic stress
disorder, anxiety and severe depression.
See also Shayna Jacobs, More than 50 people plead guilty in massive Social
Security disability scam, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (Jun. 4, 2014),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/50-admit-participatingdisability-scam-article-1.1820605 (Apparently, the recipients also had taken
disability pensions, and had received awards from the September 11 Victim
Compensation Fund (VCF)); Message from Special Master Sheila Birnbaum
(Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.vcf.gov/blogprogstatsapr2015.html (“VCF has
made loss determinations of more than $1 billion. As of March 31, 2015, the VCF
has approved 10,549 eligibility claims and rendered 4,415 loss decisions, totaling
$1,058,398,144.”); Wendy Floering, The September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund of 2001: A Better Alternative to Litigation? 22 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN.
L.JUDGES (2002) http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol22/iss1/6. Please
note that my office, DOL OALJ, heard some of these cases.
" %
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Moreover, if the allegations regarding LTD carriers in the qui tam
actions are correct, the DI trust Fund has been losing far more than
the fraud from Puerto Rico and the post 9/11 DI fraud. The LTD
losses as alleged may be continually perpetrated unless action is
taken to mitigate them.
I recommend that to protect claimants from potential fraud, to
avoid the appearance of impropriety, and to promote integrity, DI
benefits should not be offset against LTD policies. Similarly, the
Federal Employee Retirement System (FERS) requires all claimants
to apply for SSDI benefits. This requirement can lead to abuse and
should be eliminated. 428
C.Privacy Act
Our government is supposed to be open. SSA, however, has
closed DI hearings and exhibit files are not public because the agency
is overly concerned with the Privacy Act of 1974.429 SSA does not
consider its appeals process to be “legal” proceedings.430 Most of the
files contain medical records. Many claimants have companion
claims, i.e. workers’ compensation, personal injury, etc., where the
same records are available to the public.431 On appeal, at the court
level these claims are open. Even when the claimant waives privacy,
it does not permit the public, and especially the press, to view the
hearings.432
A review of the Legislative History of the Privacy Act of 1974 S.
3418 (Public Law 93-579): Source Book on Privacy, Ninety-Fourth
Congress, 2nd Session (September, 1976) shows that although Social
Security Numbers were considered when the Act was drafted, there
was no discussion about applying the Privacy Act to administrative
hearings and administrative records.433 The Privacy Act applies only

" &

For the record, I am a FERS employee who would because of my age, get
no disability benefit if and when I am disabled.
" ' 5 U.S.C. 552(a).
"! See Legislative History of the Privacy Act of 1974, S. 3418 (Pub. L. No. 93579): Source Book on Privacy, THE LIBRARY OF CONG., MILITARY LEGAL
RESOURCES (Sept. 1976), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/LH_privacy_act1974.html.
"! Id.
"! Id.
"!! Id.
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to "systems of records," 434 and most adjudicatory and rulemaking
documents are outside the scope of that term.
SSA is more protective of privacy than any other agency, but
from outside, it appears that it is the agency, rather than the parties
that craves privacy.435 Decisions by administrative law judges and the
SSA Appeals Council are rarely published; when so, mostly by
claimant representatives’ organization.436
Because SSA hearings are closed, an aura of mystery surrounds
the process. Claimants before an agency have a right to know
whether similar issues have been adjudicated to determine how to
proceed. They also have a right to know how a judge has handled
similar cases and for that matter attempt to see whether there is a
record of decisions that have been remanded or overturned.
Other agencies have no problem with the Privacy Act.437 At
DOL, in the adjudication process, the burden as to privacy is with the
parties.438
Numerous Congressional inquiries regarding “fraud” investigate
the process.439 “Sunlight” may be the best disinfectant. SSA should
"!"

See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2012) (limiting non-disclosure duty to record
contained in system of records).
"!# See e.g., Thomas C. Mans, Selecting the 'Hidden Judiciary': How the Merit
Process Works in Choosing Administrative Law Judges (Part 1), 63 JUDICATURE 60
(1979) (coining the term "hidden judiciary"); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski &
Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination of
Executive
Branch
Justice,
58
DUKE
L.J.
1477-1530
(2009),
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol58/iss7/8.
"!$ Anecdotally, I am told that even when the claimant may be represented and
clearly waives the Privacy Act, news media and other members of the public are
barred from observing hearings by SSA policy.
"!% An exception is Medicare appeals.
"!& From DOL OALJ website: It is the responsibility of counsel and the parties
to take appropriate action to seek legal protection of information from public
disclosure to the extent that such protection is available under applicable rules. See,
e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 18.15 (protective orders); § 18.43(a) (closing of hearing to
public); § 18.46 (in camera and protective orders); § 18.56 (restricted access order);
29 C.F.R. § 70.26 (designation of confidential commercial information under
FOIA). See also FOIA Update, Vol. XIII, No. 3.
"!'Steve Kroft, Disability, USA, CBS SIXTY MINUTES (Oct. 10, 2013),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/disability-usa/ (citing to Senator Tom Coburn: 25%
of recipients are gaming the system). Although the accusations should include
DDS, where 75% of the awards are rendered. Citing to the union for administrative
law judges: lawyers are gaming the system.
Congress concentrates on
administrative law judges. See Lawmakers urge broad snooping powers for Social
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publish all administrative law judge and appeals council decisions.
These can be “sanitized” to conform to the Privacy Act.440 Names
and SSNs can be redacted. Under FCRP Rule 5.2 (a), unless the court
orders otherwise, in an electronic or paper filing with the court that
contains an individual’s social-security number, taxpayeridentification number, or birth date, the name of an individual known
to be a minor, or a financial-account number, a party or nonparty
making the filing may include only: (1) the last four digits of the
social-security number and taxpayer-identification number; (2) the
year of the individual’s birth; (3) the minor’s initials; and (4) the last
four digits of the financial-account number.441
Decisions should be available to the public and especially the
parties as a matter of right. Almost all other “final” decisions are
published. A party appearing before an agency has a right to be able
to determine whether there is a track record of bias or whether there
is a track record of reversal at a higher level of review regarding
disputed issues.442 SSA applies the Privacy Act to its own employees.
Security Administration, THE WASHINGTON TIMES (April 8, 2014); Representative
Darrell Issa, Reps. James Lankford (R., Okla.), and Jim Jordan (R., Ohio) letter to
then Acting Commissioner Colvin, July 1, 2014: “We are concerned that your
testimony indicated a lack of appreciation of the substantial problem created when
ALJs essentially approve every claimant before them, regardless of whether they
are disabled or unable to work, and that you lack the commitment to fundamental
program reform.” Historically, only a few administrative law judges have been
charged criminally, but none who were topics of recent Congressional hearings.
Elizabeth Price was sentenced to eight months in prison for lying to obtain SSA
benefits for her daughter. Judge Gets Prison Term For Social Security Fraud,
SFGATE,
(Mar.
10,
2000),
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/SANFRANCISCO-Judge-Gets-Prison-Term-For-Social-2797034.php. Thomas Ploss
was sentenced to a year in prison for disclosing confidential records to an Evanston
lawyer who used the information to solicit clients. Judge sentenced for role in
Social
Security
scam,
CHICAGO
TRIBUNE
(Aug.
12,
2003),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2003-08-12/news/0308120113_1_administrativelaw-judge-district-court-sentenced.
""
Recordings of Service Observations, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/foia/bluebook/60-0362.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
"" Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2.
"" ODAR’s Division of Quality Service (DQS) reviews these complaints with
the assistance of ODAR’s regional office (RO) staff, as appropriate. § 404.940 and
§ 416.1440, Disqualification of the administrative law judge, sets forth:
An administrative law judge shall not conduct a hearing if he or
she is prejudiced or partial with respect to any party or has any
interest in the matter pending for decision. If you object to the
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Administrative law judge and Appeals Council opinions should be
public. Other agencies do not have a system of acquiescence so even
when our decisions do not have precedence, or be subject to issue
preclusion, they may be persuasive as to argument.
Again, this proposal will not prevent default of the DI Trust
Fund, and is not as crucial as the CDR and VR proposals as to
viability, but as the agency becomes more open, it becomes more
accountable. If this proposal is combined with expansion of qui tam,
it may cause more scrutiny and provide a greater reason for the
public and especially the legal community to support the Trust
Funds.
VI.Recommendation Six: Consider Adversarial Hearings
At the administrative law judge level, hearings are procedurally
“non-adversarial.” Almost all other “formal” adjudications in this
country are “adversarial” stemming from common law procedures.
SSA has been using this system from the first hearings in 1940 and
continued to use them even after passage of the APA in 1946. The
Social Security Act is a humanitarian statute and is weighted in favor
of claimants.443
The DI cases that judges hear involve substantial amounts of
money. I estimate that the exposure to the DI Trust Fund in payouts

administrative law judge who will conduct the hearing, you must
notify the administrative law judge at your earliest opportunity.
The administrative law judge shall consider your objections and
shall decide whether to proceed with the hearing or withdraw. If
he or she withdraws, the Associate Commissioner for Hearings
and Appeals, or his or her delegate, will appoint another
administrative law judge to conduct the hearing. If the
administrative law judge does not withdraw, you may, after the
hearing, present your objections to the Appeals Council as
reasons why the hearing decision should be revised or a new
hearing held before another administrative law judge.
""! The Social Security Act is a remedial statute that must be liberally
construed in favor of disability if a disability is proven. Social Security Ruling
(SSR) 71-30 (“[S]ince the Act is remedial in nature, it should be given a liberal
construction in order to effectuate its purpose.”). See also Combs v. Gardner, 382
F.2d 949, 956 (6th Cir.1967); Polly v. Gardner, 364 F.2d 969 (6th Cir.1966);
Morell E. Mullins, Sr. Coming to Terms with Strict and Liberal Construction, 64
ALB. L. REV.9 (2000). Professor Mullins is also author of the Manual for
Administrative Law Judges, UNIV. OF ARK., http://ualr.edu/malj/malj.pdf.
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of an average case involving a younger individual with a family is
about $2 million.444
In 1982, SSA initiated a Social Security Administration
Representation Project (SSARP).445 However in Salling v. Bowen,
641 F. Supp. 1046 (W.D. Va. 1986),446 SSARP was issued a
permanent injunction because the program was improperly
implemented, as SSA did not initiate the program through APA
rulemaking. It also:
1.violated SSA regulations, in that it was advertised to be nonadversarial but was adversarial from the beginning;
2.did not achieve a stated goal of aiding in the development of
cases but has, at best, maintained the present system or, at worst,
tended to cause the ALJs to rely upon the SSARs to the detriment of
claimants;
3.did not achieve its goal of improving quality of decisions or
expediting cases;
4.did not achieve its goal of increasing productivity;
5.did not achieve its goal of uniformity;
6.was in violation of the intention of the Social Security Act.447

"""I

realize that this is a disputed figure, but value includes family derivative
benefits. The value of Social Security Disability Insurance benefits for an average
hypothetical worker with median earnings, who becomes disabled at age 30
includes $405,000 in Disability Insurance payments and $178,000 in OASI
payments once the worker converts to retirement benefits. Some claimants with
higher earnings will obtain double than the average. As stated, this does not include
benefits for dependents and for survivors. See The Insurance Value of Potential
Survivor and Disability Benefits for an Illustrative Worker, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.
(Sept. 27, 2012).
Many experts estimate that the insurance value is greater than the actuarial
value because Social Security benefits are adjusted for inflation and cost-of-living,
unlike the benefits paid out by most private plans. See Martin R. Holmer, The
Value
of
Social
Security
Disability
Insurance,
AARP
(2001),
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/2001_09_ssdi. The Full Returns from Social
Security
WASHINGTON:
ECONOMIC
POLICY
INSTITUTE,
http://72.32.39.237:8080/Plone/publications/pdfs/pb50/ Baker-FullReturns.pdf.
""#The Social Security Administration and Information Technology, Special
Report, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (1986), https://www.ssa.gov/history/pdf/ota86.pdf
""$ See 42 U.S.C. § 434.
""%

Id.
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I have been arguing that the program should be re-instituted, after
agency rulemaking. 448
Public perception is that the inquisitional model is unfair.449
Meanwhile, SSA evokes “inconsistency in outcomes” as a
rationalization to blame judges for failures in delivery and quality of
disability determinations.450 However, as stated, according to agency
statistics 75% of awards are paid at lower levels.451 Members of
Congress have concentrated on attacking the hearing process, rather
than concentrating on other factors leading to Trust Fund deficits.452
""& This subject has been discussed in Frank Bloch, Jeffrey Lubbers, & Paul
Verkuil, Introducing Nonadversarial Government Representatives to Improve the
Record of Decision in Social Security Disability Adjudications, SOC. SEC.
ADVISORY
B D.
(2003),
http://www.ssab.gov/documents/Bloch-LubbersVerkuil.pdf., and more recently by Mr. Morton, see Morton, supra note 9.
""' Id.
"# See Harold Krent & Scott Morris, Achieving Greater Consistency in Social
Security Disability Adjudication: An Empirical Study and Suggested Reforms,
ACUS
(2013),
http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Achieving_Greater_Consistency
_Final_Report_4-3-2013_clean.pdf. ACUS identified “outlier” administrative law
judges, defined as two standard deviations above or below the mean, in the low
range of allowance rates.
Please note that The Social Security Administration (SSA) has engaged the
Office of the Chairman of ACUS to:
•Review and analyze the Social Security Act, as well as
SSA’s implementing regulations, policies, and practices for
adjudicating claims under titles II and XVI.
•Evaluate federal court interpretations and applications of
SSA’s rules and regulations, noting patterns that show
consistencies or inconsistencies among appellate and district
courts.
•Examine SSA’s acquiescence rulings and how the agency
applies decisions of federal appellate courts that are at variance
with SSA’s national policies.
•Survey federal court practices and procedures for handling
social security cases to identify varying approaches and
differential impacts, if any.
SSA Federal Courts Analysis, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S,,
https://www.acus.gov/research-projects/ssa-federal-courts-analysis (last visited
Sept 17, 2015). Consultants are Professors Jonah Gelbach and David Marcus.
"# Id.
"#
Although some of the allegations about some the judges who have been
“paying down the backlog” may be true, they are statistical “outliers,” and all
judges are now suspects. For example, in hearings reminiscent of show trials of
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The ALJ pretext has even been accepted in academia, where one
noted law professor suggests that to resolve deficits in the disability
trust fund, the appeals system and the administrative law judge
position should be abolished.453
In “Thinking Outside The APA Box: A New Social Security
Tribunal,” Professor

1930s Soviet Union, judges have been (as I used to tell juries) inspected, dissected
and rejected by several Congressional committees. SSA knew deficits would occur
and that economics could help to restore the funds:
Economic conditions influence the number and timing of
disabled worker claims and awards under the DI program. This
is true in spite of the fact that the DI program’s definition of
disability is based on a medical determination of the inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity without regard to the
current state of the economy. Because disability claims have
historically increased in response to periods of high
unemployment, it is reasonable to expect that the percentage of
claims that are allowed would drop under conditions of high
unemployment. Evidence presented in this note supports that
expectation.
The inverse relationship between the allowance rate for disabled
worker claims filed in a year and the unemployment rate in the
second prior year is evident in Figure 1. The most recent
recession which started in 2008 is no exception. The
unemployment rate rose from 4.6 percent for 2007 to 5.8 percent
for 2008, and allowance rates for claims filed in 2010 are lower
than rates for claims filed in 2009. The more dramatic further
increase in the unemployment rate to 9.3 percent for 2009
suggests a further drop in allowance rates for claims filed in
2011. Preliminary data for claims filed in 2011 suggest that
allowance rates will be lower than in 2010 as expected.
Stephen C. Goss, Anthony W. Cheng, Michael L. Miller, & Sven H. Sinclair,
Disabled Worker Allowance Rates: Variation under Changing Economic
Conditions, Actuarial Note, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. 153 (2013).
"#! Richard J. Pierce, What Should We Do About Social Security Disability
Appeals?,
REGULATION,
41
(2011),
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2011/9/regv34n33.pdf. But see Scapegoating Social Security Disability Claimants
(and the Judges Who Evaluate Them), AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY
(2012),
https://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Dubin__Rains__Scapegoating_Social_Security_Disability_Claimants.pdf.
Professor Pierce testified similarly before Congress.
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Michael Asimow and Judge Jeffrey S. Wolfe creation of a
separate tribunal to handle the adjudication of disability appeals.454
The tribunal, headed by a Social Security Chief Judge (SSCJ) would
be independent of SSA and able to appoint new non-APA “Social
Security Judges” (SSJs). They state that a number of approaches
deserve consideration, including:
(4) introducing government attorneys and adversarial hearings in
a limited number of case categories;
“But one additional possibility is to consider whether SSA ALJs
should become a special “breed” - especially since they make up
approximately 85% of all ALJs.”
Although they list (4) above, Asimow and Wolfe assume that the
non-adversarial system would be perpetuated.455
As currently practiced, by the time a claim reaches the hearing
level, claimants can address the basis of denial by DDS.456 At DDS,
speed is usually more important than accuracy. When SSA obtains
medical records, they do not pay the treating source to write a
narrative report, which is the gold standard to determine credibility of
the treating physician. DDS examiners usually do not send the
physicians appropriate follow-up questions. In some cases, the rules
elevate the status of the treating physician who may render an
opinion entitled to controlling weight.

"#" Should Congress Create a Special Category of SSA ALJs? 38 ADMIN. &
REG. LAW NEWS, ABA SECTION OF ADMIN. LAW & REG. PRACTICE
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/administrative_law/wint
er_2013.pdf.
In the same publication as Asimow and Wolfe, Professor Jeffrey Lubbers
published Should Congress Create a Special Category of SSA ALJs? would also
support tailoring a special selection process for SSA ALJs. This could be done in
two ways—either by a mandate to OPM to provide for specialized hiring of SSA
ALJs, or by legislatively designating them as “Social Security Judges” and
allowing SSA to fashion its own hiring process that uses the OPM process as a
model. See id. at 6, 15.
"## “In conclusion, [w]e think that the SSA adjudication program’s size,
backlog, and perhaps the character of its cases, requires some special treatment,
and, given the informality and non-adversarial nature of the cases, there is ample
reason to rethink the role and attributes of the adjudicators— at least going
forward.”
"#$ Id.
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Further production of evidence is usually entirely one sided.457 A
claimant can develop tailored evidence to overcome objections at the
lower level. Besides more recent test results and treatment notes, the
claimant can provide narrative medical reports and answers to
tailored interrogatories.458 The lawyer is free to attack the credibility
of the medical evidence and also the credibility of the individuals
rendering a negative opinion.
If a VE is needed, effective cross-examination can nullify the
vocational testimony. Claimants are free to call their own medical
and vocational witnesses.
SSA does not develop rebuttal evidence.
By the time a case gets to hearing, a good lawyer can create an
overwhelming record. Even in an imperfect record, after the fact,
good claimant lawyers may be able to overcome any agency decision
in the current posture. Under the law, even if claims are appealed and
lost at every level, including the United States Supreme Court, the
decision may very well be reopened through modification.459 As
people get older, it is expected that the human body will deteriorate.
20 CFR § 404.988 provides that a claim may be opened within a year
of filing the initial claim for any reason, or within four years for good
cause.460 Good cause for reopening:
(a) We will find that there is good cause to reopen a
determination or decision if (1) New and material evidence is furnished;461

"#% I find that most private lawyers will not waste time and money on cases
they know will be losers. This may be the principal reason that many claimants are
pro se. I also recommend that pro se claimants should be sent to representatives. At
one time, legal services filled this duty; more recently they cannot due to a lack of
funding.
"#& Some of the lawyers who used to appear before me, presented a “sworn
statement” which is actually a one-sided deposition of the treating physician. The
questioning would usually track the sequential evaluation. In most cases, if the
claimant presented a combination of severe impairments, the physician was
questioned whether or not a listed impairment was equaled.
"#' 20 C.F.R. § 404.989.
"$ Id.
"$ Id.

230

$!# #""#"#!#% & $"

,-'*

New evidence very well may contain supportive narrative reports
or statements from physicians whose opinions were discounted in the
case decision.
The percentage of claimants, who are represented, has
skyrocketed at the same time that receipts have increased due to the
2008 recession.462 SSA permits withholding of past due benefits to
pay representatives fees if a standard form attorney’s fee contract is
filed.463 At the same time that SSA became less concerned with
accuracy and more concerned with backlogs, in 2004, the agency and
Congress relaxed rules governing representation, making it easier for
non-lawyer advocates to get paid.464 Some large firms hired brigades
of non-lawyers, and advertised nationally.465 See Table 3 for “Top
Reps” in 2010. All made in excess of $1.5 million in FY 2010.466 In
2010, administrative law judges complained to Congress; they
accused some firms of doctoring records and withholding
unsupportive medical evidence as a matter of course.467 After it was
bought by a hedge fund, in December, 2014, the top ranked firm,
with about 57,000 clients and approximately 900 employees in 13
states declared bankruptcy.468

"$
Compilation Of The Social Security Laws, Part B- Procedural and
General
Provisions,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.
https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/ssact/title16b/1631.htm.
"$! Id.
"$" Damian Paletta & Dionne Searcey, Two Lawyers Strike Gold In U.S.
Disability
System,
WALL
STREET
JOURNAL
(Dec.
11,
2011)
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203518404577096632862007046
.
"$# Oversight of Rising Social Security Disability Claims and The Role of
Administrative Law Judges: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Policy,
Health Care and Entitlements of the Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t H.R., 113th
Cong.
75-77
(2013)
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG113hhrg82276/html/CHRG-113hhrg82276.htm (statement of Hon. J.E. Sullivan,
A.L.J., Office of Hearings, U.S. Dep’t of Transp.). See also, Paletta and Searcey, ,
supra note 469.
"$$ See Table 3 for “Top Reps” in 2010.
"$% Id.
"$& Jonathan LaMantia, Binder & Binder files for bankruptcy: One of the
nation's largest Social Security disability firms had to reduce institutional debt
after payments from the federal government slowed, CRAIN’S NEW YORK BUSINESS
(Dec.
19,
2014),
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20141219/PROFESSIONAL_SERVICES/1
41219807/binder-binder-files-for-bankruptcy.
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It is reasonable to expect that many of the representation abuses
will abate if representatives are required to justify their fees.
I also think that good prosecutors may be able to guide
settlements. As started earlier, SSA DI is an all or nothing
proposition. But it may be feasible in some cases, to work out a VR
plan through the principles in Recommendation Number Three that
will satisfy the claimant. Administrative law judges should be given
authority to approve such plans.469
Prosecutors may also be able to perform further discovery. As
stated, at present SSA does not obtain rebuttal evidence. 470Newer
evidence may be needed. It may be that new evidence will
substantiate the claimant’s position and there may not be a need for a
hearing. The parties may agree to further testing or another form of
evaluation.
Further the parties can reduce the degree of difficulty in rendering
a decision and reducing it to writing by presenting binding
stipulations.471 A summary decision rule would permit easy cases to
be awarded as soon as the evidence is collected. Also, a judge should
be able to require an Order to Show cause regarding whether there is
evidence to substantiate a “severe” impairment. See
Recommendation Four A regarding step 2 of the sequential
evaluation.472
I do not think that conversion to an adversarial process will affect
the DI Trust Fund immediately, but it will bring some stability to the
system. The CBO in 2012 Policy Options stated that in the short term
it would add certain costs for hiring and training but, might, over the
long run result in lower spending for the program because fewer

"$'

See also supra Recommendation Three in text.
Rebuttal Procedures and Presumed Maximum Value (PMW) Rule, SOC.
SEC. ADMIN., https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0203910040 (last revised Aug.
18, 2015).
"% Under current practice the records often contain hundreds, if not thousands
of pages of raw hospital and other treatment records that may/ may not been culled
for duplicates and other procedural flaws. In an adversarial setting, the parties can
be required to present medical and other evidence summaries, and the parties can
be required to comment on the accuracy. I argue that most of the employee time
spent currently on developing records is completely unnecessary. Administrative
law judges should be given authority to rely on medical summaries and stipulated
evidence.
"% See supra Recommendation Four in text.
"%
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people would be admitted.473 “However, the effects that any of those
modifications would have on the disability determination process are
uncertain, and CBO did not estimate the budgetary impact.”474
As I envision it, administrative law judges will be able to devote
their time and energy on hearing and deciding cases more
expeditiously.475 I do not think the CBO took procedural reforms into
effect. Both speed and accuracy will increase so if SSA remains
devoted to judicial “production,” this recommendation will yield it. If
opened to public scrutiny, this recommendation will improve public
confidence that the system is not rife with fraud and ripe for failure.
At this time, because there is no basis for comparison, I recommend,
as stated earlier, that Congress reinstate and improve on SSARP
rather than immediately adopt the adversary process without testing
it.476 I think that Recommendations One and Two are as close to sure
things as simple mathematics in this dimension can offer.477 I think
that Recommendation can completely change how claims are decided
at Step 5 of the sequential evaluation.478
However, if an adversarial outcome yields one (1) less affirmed
case per year per judge @ $2,000,000 x 1400 judges = $280,000,000
in future savings.479 I argue that the costs for a demonstration project
will yield far greater savings than expenditures. This can be another
boon to future DI Trust Fund prospects.
Anticipating objections that imposition of the Equal Access to
Justice Act (EAJA), when successful claimants are entitled to fees for
prosecution of the claim in an adversarial system, will require greater

"%! Similar to Professor Lubbers, they suggest modifying the selection criteria
for administrative law judges, increasing the length of their training, and improving
the consistency of training among localities. Another example of a possible change
in the program’s administrative procedures involves altering the hearing process.
Professor Lubbers would add a new classification of administrative judges rather
than administrative law judges.
"%",Testimony: The Social Security Disability Insurance Program, CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE (2013), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress2013-2014/reports/43995_DI-testimony_one-column.pdf.
"%# I suspect that far fewer hearings will need to be held. Although prosecutors
need to be hired, fewer administrative law judges will eventually be needed.
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payouts, any exposure for EAJA fees will pale compared to the
projected savings.480 Under EAJA, the statutory cap is $125 per
hour.481 Moreover, any recovery would be offset by the amount
awarded in back benefits under an approved fee agreement, which
are, on average, about 20% of recovery.482
VII. CONCLUSION
Although recipients and applicants for DI may be relieved by
passage of the savings bill, however that does not mean that the Fund
will be safe. For a 2-year period (FY 2016 and FY 2017), the
legislation increases discretionary spending by $80 billion, split
evenly between defense and nondefense programs, above the Budget
Control Act (BCA) (P.L. 11225) sequester-level spending caps.
Sequester relief of $50 billion will be applied to FY 2016 and $30
billion to FY 2017.483 What will happen after that is speculative. The
vote was not unanimous. The House voted 266 to 167. The Senate
vote was 64 to 35. 484 Many “nay” members of Congress wanted
default.
There are few investments that can yield $9 for every $1 spent.
VR analysis at time of DI application holds this promise. See
Recommendations Two and Three. Congress has, on the taxpayers’
behalf, rejected the investment. Instead, in the name of austerity,
some members intend to cut current investments. Utilizing some of
the recommendations, especially Recommendation Three, could
possibly yield over $100 for each dollar spent. Recommendations
One to Three could actually serve to stimulate the economy.
If the DI Trust Fund defaults, current and prospective recipients
would receive only about 80% of their current income.485 As I stated
"&

I-1-2-91, Equal Access to Justice Act, Social Security,
https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/hallex/I-01/I-1-2-91.html.
"& Meanwhile, I hear cases involving some lawyers in fee shifting cases who
can justify a fee based on more than $400 per hour. A couple of lawyers who have
appeared before me, bill their defense clients in excess of $1000 per hour. I don’t
think that these lawyers will take an EAJA case.
"& 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412 d(2)(A) (2015).
"&! Congress Passes H.R. 1314, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, supra note
1.
"&" Id.
"&# Ehrenfreund, supra note 6. See also Statement of Inspector Gen. O’Carroll
Jr., supra note 112.
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previously, most Americans, even those who pay FICA taxes do not
understand the difference between DI and SSI. They are often
depicted in Congress and by the media as unworthy.486 There is a
tendency in some quarters to label them as “takers.”487 Actually,
those DI recipients who worked and paid are currently and fully
insured.488 Their benefits are based on an earnings record and on
meeting strict conditions of a social insurance policy. Although most
of them justifiably relied on promises that the Trust fund would be
protected, DI recipients will suffer most if a default occurs.
When SSI was created in 1973 by the Nixon Administration, a
vocal minority expressed displeasure with “Federalism,” and wanted

"&$ See Jonathan P. Baird, My Turn: The art of hating the poor, CONCORD
MONITOR (Jun. 2, 2015), http://www.concordmonitor.com/home/17046621-95/myturn-the-art-of-hating-the-poor. “Being hostile to poor people is a long American
tradition. Historically, the American people have fluctuated between a desire to
help the deserving needy and an alternating desire to castigate and punish the
undeserving poor. The tension between these conflicting desires lies behind public
policy disputes about poverty and what to do about it.” Baird is an administrative
law judge, assigned to SSA. “The view is not one that sees poverty as a result of
misfortune or social class. It is about bad persons. Poverty is seen as a willful result
of personal deficiencies, laziness and vice.”
On the Investment Watch blog, this comment is typical:
Darkwing: “Most of the people on SS disability, never put a
dime in the fund. I know dozens of people over the years, that
are getting disibility [sic] pay check and never worked in their
lives. Total scum.”
Social Security Disability Payments to be Cut?, INVESTMENT WATCH (2015),
http://investmentwatchblog.com/social-security-disability-payments-to-be-cut/
"&% See John Attarian, Essays In Political Economy The Roots of The Social
Security Myth, LUDWIG VON MISES INSTITUTE 1, 53 (2001),
https://mises.org/sites/default/files/Roots%20of%20the%20Social%20Security%20
Myth_2.pdf. –“Social Security has had a very corrosive and degrading effect on our
national character. Instead of fostering fortitude and self-reliance, it has encouraged
whiny dependence. It has made Americans first servile and then petulant in their
relations with their government: tamely submitting to crushing tax burdens in their
productive years under the deliberately-cultivated delusion that they were buying
something for themselves, and in their retirement years, railing at any attempt,
however innocuous, to trim benefits. Its zero-sum finance, whereby the
beneficiary’s gain is inescapably the taxpayer’s loss, has made the old callous
toward the program’s burdens on the young, and the young resentful of the old. It is
telling that the sour epithet ’greedy geezer’ was unknown in America until the
elderly mobilized in the 1970s and 1980s to protect Social Security.” Id. at 53.
"&& Id.
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to retain independent state disability systems.489 In compromise,
funds for the development of claims mostly are spent at the DDS,
state agency level. In the main, most SSI claimants benefitted from
federalizing the state claims. I do not address SSI viability,
longstanding arguments that the DDS system should be nationalized,
or whether SSI adjudication should be returned to the states.
More recently, antagonism over federalization has risen and is the
basis for much of the exaggerations and distortions about SSA.490
Many pundits had predicted that the Trust Funds would have dried up
by now.491 Some Administrations, like proverbial foxes in charge,
added to the folklore. Inaction between 2001 – 2009, combined with
a “pay down the backlog” attitude, and a swelling of the rolls, is
sometimes confabulated by agency incompetence and outright fraud.
To a reasonable degree of certainty, “indolence” regarding the
impending DI Trust Fund default appears to have been planned as
part of the privatization effort. Likewise, the Budget Control Act of
2011 (BCA), especially cutting CDR funding, was penny wise and
pound foolish and accelerated entropy.492
From the onset of the Fund, generations of Americans were told
that there would be nothing left for them when they needed it. Many
baby boomers who paid their FICA and are now vested had believed
"&'

Id.
Some argue that FICA is not insurance but coercive redistribution of
wealth. See Attarian supra note 492, “Abolition of this tax is essential for
exploding the false consciousness. [Under Attarian’s plan] [t]hose born after 1945
would lose their Social Security benefits and would have to recognize the OASDI
taxes they have already paid for what they are—redistributive transfers. On the
other hand, they would be free to make their own arrangements for old age with the
money they now pay in Social Security taxes. A less severe option would be to
permit people after 1945 to make a free choice between receiving their benefits or
receiving tax lifetime exemptions equal to or greater than accumulated benefits.”
Pp. 52-53. See also Greenspan, supra note 6. Ironically, Greenspan, a philosophical
opponent to the concept, was Chair of the National Commission on Social Security
Reform, which “fixed” the trust funds in 1983. Greenspan Commission: Report of
the Nat’l Commission on Social Security Reform,
SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (1983), http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/gspan.html.
+,) Id.
+,* Kathy Ruffing, Failure to Fund Disability Reviews Is Penny Wise and
Pound Foolish, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Mar. 11, 2013),
http://www.cbpp.org/blog/failure-to-fund-disability-reviews-is-penny-wise-andpound-foolish.
"'
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these tales of woe. They never expected to be entitled to anything.
They voted for candidates who also believed in doom. But they now
must be pleasantly surprised that their FICA payments have turned
out to have been a sound investment, and they can now receive DI (or
retirement) benefits.
However, due to exigent circumstances, pain may well be
imminent. The vast majority of DI recipients are innocent. Congress
needs to protect their investments.
Millions of recipients may fall from DI to SSDC, partly within
the SSI category, due to declining income and resources. This could
put further pressure on the general funds of the United States. In
some states DI receipts constitute a large part of the local economy.
DI default will add pressure to have local entities pick up the tab.
Because there will be less money in circulation, unemployment will
occur. It is also reasonable to expect that the current adjudication
system will need to be revamped.
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Table 4.A2 Disability Insurance, 1957–2013 (in millions of dollars)
Receipts

Year

a

Expenditures

Net payroll
Income Transfers from
tax
from the general fund
contributio taxation of
of the
Net
c
b
Total
ns
benefits
Treasury interest d

Assets

Transfers to
Benefit
Railroad
payment Administrative Retirement
e
Total
s
expenses
program

Net
increase Amount
during
at end
year of year

1957

709

702

...

...

7

59

57

3

...

649

649

1958

991

966

...

...

25

261

249

12

...

729

1,379

1959

931

891

...

...

40

485

457

50

-22

447

1,825

1960

1,063

1,010

...

...

53

600

568

36

-5

464

2,289

1961

1,104

1,038

...

...

66

956

887

64

5

148

2,437

1962

1,114

1,046

...

...

68

1,183

1,105

66

11

-69

2,368

1963

1,165

1,099

...

...

66

1,297

1,210

68

20

-133

2,235

1964

1,218

1,154

...

...

64

1,407

1,309

79

19

-188

2,047

1965

1,247

1,188

...

...

59

1,687

1,573

90

24

-440

1,606

1966

2,079

2,006

...

16

58

1,947

1,784

137

25

133

1,739

1967

2,379

2,286

...

16

78

2,089

1,950

109

31

290

2,029

1968

3,454

3,316

...

32

106

2,458

2,311

127

20

996

3,025

1969

3,792

3,599

...

16

177

2,716

2,557

138

21

1,075

4,100

1970

4,774

4,481

...

16

277

3,259

3,085

164

10

1,514

5,614

1971

5,031

4,620

...

50

361

4,000

3,783

205

13

1,031

6,645

1972

5,572

5,107

...

51

414

4,759

4,502

233

24

813

7,457

1973

6,443

5,932

...

52

458

5,973

5,764

190

20

470

7,927

1974

7,378

6,826

...

52

500

7,196

6,957

217

22

182

8,109

1975

8,035

7,444

...

90

502

8,790

8,505

256

29

-754

7,354

1976

8,757

8,233

...

103

422

10,366

10,055

285

26

-1,609

5,745

1977

9,570

9,138

...

128

304

11,945

11,547

399

-1

-2,375

3,370

1978

13,810

13,413

...

142

256

12,954

12,599

325

30

856

4,226

1979

15,590

15,114

...

118

358

14,186

13,786

371

30

1,404

5,630

1980

13,871

13,255

...

130

485

15,872

15,515

368

-12

-2,001

3,629

1981

17,078

16,738

...

168

172

17,658

17,192

436

29

-580

3,049

1982

22,715

21,995

...

174

546

17,992

17,376

590

26

f

-358

2,691

1983

20,682

17,991

...

1,121

1,569

18,177

17,524

625

28

2,505

5,195

1984

17,309

15,503

190

441

1,174

18,546

17,898

626

22

-1,237

3,959

1985

19,301

17,014

222

1,195

870

19,478

18,827

608

43

f

2,363

6,321

1986

19,439

18,247

238

152

803

20,522

19,853

600

68

f

1,459

7,780

1987

20,303

19,538

-36

153

648

21,425

20,519

849

57

-1,122

6,658

1988

22,699

21,837

61

202

600

22,494

21,695

737

61

206

6,864

1989

24,795

23,797

95

196

707

23,753

22,911

754

88

1,041

7,905

1990

28,791

28,403

144

-639

883

25,616

24,829

707

80

3,174

11,079

1991

30,390

29,128

190

9

1,063

28,571

27,695

794

82

1,819

12,898

1992

31,430

30,148

232

-12

1,062

32,004

31,112

834

58

-574

12,324

1993

32,301

31,182

281

4

835

35,662

34,613

966

83

-3,361

8,963

1994

52,841

51,372

311

1

1,157

38,879

37,744

1,029

106

13,962

22,925

1995

56,696

54,404

341

-207

2,158

42,055

40,923

1,064

68

14,641

37,566
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Table 4.A2 Disability Insurance, 1957–2013 (in millions of dollars)
Receipts

Year

a

Expenditures

Net payroll
Income Transfers from
tax
from the general fund
contributio taxation of
of the
Net
c
Total
ns b
benefits
Treasury interest d

Assets

Transfers to
Benefit
Railroad
payment Administrative Retirement
e
Total
s
expenses
program

Net
increase Amount
during
at end
year of year

1996

60,710

57,325

373

g

3,012

45,351

44,189

1,160

2

15,359

52,924

1997

60,499

56,037

470

g

3,992

47,034

45,695

1,280

59

13,465

66,389

1998

64,357

58,966

558

g

4,832

49,931

48,207

1,567

157

14,425

80,815

1999

69,541

63,203

661

g

5,677

53,035

51,381

1,519

135

16,507

97,321

2000

77,920

71,093

721

-836

6,942

56,782

54,983

1,639

159

21,138 118,459

2001

83,903

74,933

811

g

8,158

61,369

59,618

1,741

10

22,534 140,993

2002

87,379

77,272

930

g

9,178

67,905

65,702

2,049

154

19,475 160,468

2003

88,074

77,442

944

g

9,689

73,108

70,933

2,008

167

14,966 175,434

2004

91,380

80,281

1,111

g

9,988

80,597

78,229

2,152

215

10,783 186,217

2005

97,423

86,077

1,073

g

10,273

88,018

85,365

2,315

338

9,405 195,623

2006

102,641

90,808

1,230

g

10,603

94,456

91,741

2,326

388

8,185 203,808

2007

109,854

95,243

1,393

8

13,210

98,778

95,865

2,468

445

11,076 214,884

2008

109,840

97,566

1,313

g

10,961 108,951

106,007

2,526

418

889 215,773

2009

109,283

96,865

1,955

g

10,463 121,506

118,315

2,743

448

-12,223 203,550

2010

104,017

92,511

1,852

363

9,292 127,660

124,216

2,982

462

-23,643 179,907

2011

106,276

81,881

1,581

14,927

7,887 132,332

128,948

2,920

465

-26,056 153,850

2012

109,115

85,615

583

16,546

6,371 140,299

136,897

2,890

512

-31,184 122,666

2013

111,228

105,402

391

729

4,706 143,450

140,130

2,769

551

-32,221

90,445

SOURCE: Department of the Treasury.
a. The definitions of the categories "net payroll tax contributions" and "reimbursements from the general fund of the Treasury" were revised in
2011. Data in these two columns for 1984 and later may vary from those in prior editions, but total receipts are unchanged. b. Beginning in 1983,
includes transfers from the general fund of the Treasury representing contributions that would have been paid on deemed wage credits for
military service in 1957–2001, if such credits were considered to be covered wages. c. Includes payments (1) in 1966 and later, for costs of
noncontributory wage credits for military service performed before 1957; (2) in 1971–1982, for costs of deemed wage credits for military service
performed after 1956; (3) in 1968 and later, for costs of benefits to certain uninsured persons who attained age 72 before 1968; (4) in 1984 for
employees, and in 1984–1989 for self-employed persons, for payroll tax credits provided under Public Law 98-21; and (5) in 2010–2012, for
payroll tax revenue forgone under the provisions of Public Laws 111-147, 111-312, 112-78, and 112-96. d. Includes net profits or losses on
marketable securities; interest adjustments on amounts reimbursed from, or paid to, other trust funds or the general fund of the Treasury; and
relatively small amounts of gifts to the fund. e. Beginning in 1966, includes payments for vocational rehabilitation services furnished to disabled
persons receiving benefits because of their disabilities. Beginning in 1983, amounts are reduced by amount of reimbursement for unnegotiated
benefit checks. f. The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund borrowed from the Disability Insurance and Hospital Insurance Trust Funds
in 1982, and repaid the borrowed amounts in 1985 and 1986. Amounts for these years are equal to total receipts less total expenditures, plus
amounts borrowed or less amounts repaid. g. Between -$500,000 and $500,000.493
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SEC. 102. SOCIAL SECURITY .
(a) Social Security Revenues- For purposes of Senate enforcement
under sections 302 and 311 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974,
the amounts of revenues of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust
Fund are as follows:
Fiscal year 2016:
Fiscal year 2021:
$792,776,000,000.
$962,188,000,000.
Fiscal year 2017:
Fiscal year 2022:
$824,342,000,000.
$1,000,637,000,000.
Fiscal year 2018:
Fiscal year 2023:
$857,154,000,000.
$1,040,394,000,000.
Fiscal year 2019:
Fiscal year 2024:
$890,609,000,000.
$1,081,476,000,000.
Fiscal year 2020:
Fiscal year 2025:
$925,760,000,000.
$1,123,748,000,000.
(b) Social Security Outlays- For purposes of Senate enforcement
under sections 302 and 311 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974,
the amounts of outlays of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust
Fund are as follows:
Fiscal year 2021:
Fiscal year 2016:
$778,032,000,000.
$1,073,227,000,000.
Fiscal year 2022:
Fiscal year 2017:
$825,829,000,000.
$1,145,188,000,000.
Fiscal year 2023:
Fiscal year 2018:
$1,222,754,000,000.
$882,521,000,000.
Fiscal year 2024:
Fiscal year 2019:
$941,034,000,000.
$1,305,622,000,000.
Fiscal year 2020:
Fiscal year 2025:
$1,005,632,000,000.
$1,394,327,000,000.
(c) Social Security Administrative Expenses- In the Senate, the
amounts of new budget authority and budget outlays of the Federal
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal
Disability Insurance Trust Fund for administrative expenses are as
follows:
Fiscal year 2016:
(A) New budget authority,
$5,026,000,000.
(B) Outlays,
$5,089,000,000.
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Fiscal year 2017:
(A) New budget authority,
$5,175,000,000.
(B) Outlays,
$5,190,000,000.
Fiscal year 2018:
(A) New budget authority,
$5,345,000,000.
(B) Outlays,
$5,316,000,000.
Fiscal year 2019:
(A) New budget authority,
$5,518,000,000.
(B) Outlays,
$5,487,000,000.
Fiscal year 2020:
(A) New budget authority,
$5,699,000,000.
B) Outlays, $5,668,000,000.
Fiscal year 2021:
(A) New budget authority,
$5,881,000,000.
(B) Outlays,
$5,849,000,000.
Fiscal year 2022:
(A) New budget authority,
$6,072,000,000.
(B) Outlays,
$6,039,000,000.
Fiscal year 2023:
(A) New budget authority,
$6,266,000,000.
(B) Outlays,
$6,232,000,000.
Fiscal year 2024:
(A) New budget authority,
$6,462,000,000.
(B) Outlays,
$6,428,000,000.
Fiscal year 2025:

,-'*

(A) New budget authority,
$6,665,000,000.
(B) Outlays,
$6,630,000,000.493

"'! S. Con. Res. 11, 114th Cong.
§
102
(2015),
https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/s
conres11/BILLS114sconres11es.pdf.
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TOP REPS
The Social Security Administration pays legal firms directly for
successfully winning disability benefits for their clients. Here are the
top 10 individuals collecting fees from 2010.
Name
2010 payments Based
Comment?
Charles
$22,817,430.62 Hauppauge, Declined to comment
Binder
N.Y.
Thomas
$6,292,296.41 Chicago
Didn't respond to request for
Nash
comment
Eric Conn $3,815,512.96 Stanville, Didn't respond to request for
Ky.
comment
Michael
$3,614,429.13 Lousiville, Didn't respond to request for
Sullivan
Ky.
comment
Frank
$3,464,262.24 Colton,
Didn't respond to request for
Latour
Calif.
comment
Ronald
$3,241,150.42 Santa
A spokesman for Disability
Miller
Monica,
Group, the firm run by Mr.
Calif.
Miller, said, 'Statistically,
claimants who employ an
attorney to represent them
are much more likely to win
than
those
who
go
unrepresented.
We are
proud of the results we have
achieved for our clients,
helping them obtain justly
deserved benefits. The $3.2
million is for the work
performed by our national
firm to help clients achieve
their deserved benefits.'
Juan
$2,816,311.80 Bayamon, Didn't respond to request for
Hernandez
Puerto Rico comment
Rivera
Robert
$2,531,046.93 Seattle
Didn't respond to request for
Friedman
comment
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Matthew $2,004,375.65 New
Didn't respond to request for
Greenbaum
Orleans
comment
Thomas
$1,668,758.92 Yakima,
Declined to comment
Bothwell
Wash.
Source: Social Security Administration. 494


"'" Damian Paletta & Dionne Searcey, Two Lawyers Strike Gold In U.S.
Disability
System,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Dec.
11,
2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203518404577096632862007046
.

